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1 Introduction
This thesis deals with economic models in the presence of externalities. Fol-
lowing La!ont (1988), we provide below the definition of externality.
An externality is any “indirect e!ect” that a consumption or a production
activity has on individual preferences and on consumption or production
possibilities.
“Indirect e!ect” means that the e!ect is created by an economic agent di!erent
from the one who is a!ected, and the e!ect is not produced through the price
system. In this case the price system only plays the role of matching demand
and supply. 3 The definition above shows that the presence of externalities
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3 On the other hand, the external e!ects that directly pass through the price system
are called pecuniary externalities.
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requires a new description of agents’ characteristics (individual preferences,
consumption sets and production technologies).
The thesis consists of three chapters. Chapter 1 deals with the existence of
competitive equilibria in a general production economy with externalities. In
Chapter 2, we provide some regularity results in production economies with
externalities. In Chapter 3 we study some testable restrictions in a specific
model with externalities and public goods. One finds below an introduction
of the three chapters.
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1.1 Chapter 1 – “Existence of Equilibria in a General Equilibrium model with
Production and Externalities: A Di!erentiable Approach”
In Chapter 1, we consider a general model of production economy with con-
sumption and production externalities. In a di!erentiable framework, our pur-
pose is to prove the non-emptiness and the compactness of the set of compe-
titive equilibria with consumptions and prices strictly positive.
Why do we care about the existence of equilibria from a di!erentiable view-
point? The starting point of studying the set of regular economies is the non-
empty and compact set of equilibria in a di!erentiable setting. The relevance of
regular economies and issues related to the global approach of the equilibrium
analysis are discussed in the following subsection.
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Our model of externalities is based on the seminal works by La!ont and
Laroque (1972), La!ont (1977,1978,1988), where individual consumption sets,
individual preferences and production technologies depend on the choices of
all households and firms. We provide below some economic examples of this
dependency.
• (Externalities on preferences). Building of a mall in a residential area
is an example of positive (or negative) externalities created by a firm on the
preferences of people living in that area.
• (Externalities on consumption sets). As in general equilibrium mo-
dels à la Arrow–Debreu, each individual has to choose a consumption in
his consumption set which describes the set of all consumption alternatives
which are a priori possible for the individual. In the following examples,
externalities a!ect individual consumption sets and do not directly a!ect
preferences. i) In the case of internet or electricity, the congestion due to the
global consumption limits the physically possible individual consumption,
ii) an increase in the production of transport services decreases the minimal
threshold of consumption of fuel, (iii) an increase of polluting production
makes worse the individual health, and consequently it increases the survival
threshold of consumption of medicines.
• (Externalities on production technologies). In counterpart, externali-
ties may be created by consumers on firms. For instance, an over consump-
tion of air-conditioner and consequently of electricity, might produce an
electrical breakdown, decreasing all the production activities. Finally, ex-
ternalities may be created by firms on firms. For example, (i) the polluting
production of a firm that damages the land used by an agricultural firm
might cause a reduction of the production of the agricultural firm, (ii) a
firm that extracts oil from a land can a!ect another firm that extracts
oil from a nearby land whenever the oil comes from an joint underground
reservoir.
In Chapter 1, we consider a private ownership economy with a finite num-
ber of commodities, households and firms. Each firm is characterized by a
technology described by an inequality on a di!erentiable function called the
transformation function. 4 Each household is characterized by a consumption
set, preferences and an initial endowment of commodities. Each consumption
set is described by an inequality on a di!erentiable function called the possibi-
lity function. The same idea is used in recent works on restricted participation
in financial markets where portfolio sets are described by linear or di!eren-
4 For production technologies described by transformation functions, see for in-
stance Mas-Colell et al. (1995).
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tiable functions. 5 Individual preferences are represented by a utility function.
Firms are owned by households. Utility, possibility and transformation func-
tions depend on the consumption of all households and on the production
activity of all firms.
Facing a price system, each firm chooses in his production set a production
plan which solves his profit maximization problem taking as given the choices
of the others, i.e. given the level of externality created by the other firms
and households. Each household chooses in his consumption set a consump-
tion bundle which solves his utility maximization problem under the budget
constraint taking as given the choices of the others, i.e. given the level of ex-
ternality created by the other households and firms. The associated concept of
equilibrium is nothing else than an equilibrium à la Nash, the resulting allo-
cation being feasible with the initial resources of agents. This notion includes
as a particular case the classical equilibrium definition without externalities
at all.
The main result of Chapter 1 is Theorem 12 which states that for all initial
endowments which satisfy appropriate survival conditions, the set of compet-
itive equilibria with consumptions and prices strictly positive is non-empty
and compact.
Following the seminal work by Smale (1974), and more recent works by Vil-
lanacci and Zenginobuz (2005) and Bonnisseau and del Mercato (2010), we
prove Theorem 12 using Smale’s extended approach and homotopy argu-
ments. 6 The homotopy idea is that any economy with externalities is con-
nected by an arc to some economy without externalities at all. Along this arc,
equilibria move in a continuous way without sliding o! the boundary.
Smale’s extended approach di!ers from the one based on the aggregate excess
demand function by the feature that equilibria are described in terms of first
order conditions and market clearing conditions. In the presence of external-
ities, this approach overcomes the following di"culty: the individual demand
functions depend on the individual demand functions of the others, which de-
pend on the individual demand functions of the others, and so on. So, it would
be impossible to define an aggregate excess demand function which depends
only on prices and initial endowments.
We now compare our contribution with previous works. Villanacci and Zengi-
nobuz (2005) focus on a specific kind of externalities, namely pubic goods.
Bonnisseau and del Mercato (2010) consider a pure exchange economy where
5 See for instance, Siconolfi (1986,1988), Balasko, Cass and Siconolfi (1990), Pole-
marchakis and Siconolfi (1997), Cass, Siconolfi and Villanacci (2001), Carosi and
Villanacci (2005), Aouani and Cornet (2009).
6 The reader can find a survey of this approach in Villanacci et al. (2002).
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only consumption externalities are studied. So, Chapter 1 extends the latter
one to the case of externalities in a production economy.
In Kung (2008) and Mandel (2008), each consumption set coincides with the
positive orthant of the commodity space. So, concerning the consumption side,
our result is more general since it also allows externalities on general consump-
tion sets. Furthermore, in Kung (2008) firms produce private and public goods
but there are no private externalities on the production side. Concerning the
existence proof, di!erently from our contribution, Mandel (2008) uses an ap-
proach based on the aggregate excess demand and the Brouwer degree. But,
in order to use aggregate excess demand’s approach the author has to enlarge
the commodity space treating externalities as additional variables. Further-
more, following Chapter 4 of Milnor (1965), our proof is based on the theory
of degree modulo 2. The degree theory modulo 2 is simpler than the Brouwer
degree that requires the concept of oriented manifold in order to deduce the
existence result from regularity properties and from the Index Theorem.
Finally, the result by Bonnisseau and Médecin (2001) is more general than
ours since in that work individual consumption sets and firms technologies are
represented by correspondences, and the existence proof is based on fixed point
arguments. Moreover, in Bonnisseau and Médecin (2001) non-convexities are
allowed on the production side. For this reason, their existence result involves
more sophisticated techniques than those we use. Since we are interested in a
model where one can perform comparative static analysis, at the cost of loosing
generality, to describe individual consumption sets and firms technologies we
choose to use an inequality on di!erentiable functions instead of more general
correspondences. Furthermore, in order to use Smale’s extended approach and
standard first order conditions, fixing the externalities we require classical
convexity assumptions to be satisfied. In this mild context, we provide an
existence proof simpler than that of Bonnisseau and Médecin (2001).
1.2 Chapter 2 – “Externalities in Production Economies: Regularity results”
In Chapter 2, we consider a production economy with consumption and pro-
duction externalities. Our propose is to provide su"cient conditions for the
generic regularity of such economies.
Why do we care about regular economies? We recall that an economy is regular
if it has a finite set of equilibria and if every equilibrium locally depends in a
continuous or di!erentiable manner on the parameters describing the economy.
Therefore, at a regular economy, it is possible to perform comparative static
analysis. The relevance of regular economies and issues related to the global
approach of the equilibrium analysis can be found in Smale (1981), Mas-Colell
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(1985), Balasko (1988).
Regular economies are also important for two key aspects listed below.
(1) Pareto improving policies. It is well known that several sources of market
failures such as incomplete financial markets, public goods and external-
ities prevent competitive equilibrium allocations to be Pareto optimal.
In recent works, the achievement of Pareto improving policies is based
on the set of regular economies. In di!erent settings, see for instance
Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986, 2008), Citanna, Kajii and Vil-
lanacci (1998), Citanna, Polemarchakis and Tirelli (2006), Villanacci and
Zenginobuz (2006, 2010).
(2) Testable restrictions. An economic model is testable if it generates re-
strictions that must be satisfied by the observable data. It is well known
that there are two ways to construct testable restrictions. The “non-
parametric” approach is based on the general revealed preferences axiom
(GARP) or related axioms. On the other hand, the “parametric” ap-
proach is based on di!erentiable techniques which give rise to conditions
remindful Slutsky conditions. This approach focuses on the local struc-
ture of the equilibrium manifold, that is, on regular economies, see for
instance Chiappori, Ekeland, Kübler and Polemarchakis (2004).
It is an important and still open issue to study Pareto improving policies in the
presence of externalities. Furthermore, before implementing any public policy
one should verify whether the observed data are consistent with the economic
model. So, Chapter 2 is a first step to study testable restrictions and Pareto
improving policies in production economies with externalities.
As in Chapter 1, we consider a private ownership economy with consumption
and production externalities. But, we restrict our attention to the case in which
all the consumption sets coincide with the positive orthant of the commodity
space. So, concerning the consumption side the model discussed in Chapter 2
is less general than the one considered in Chapter 1.
Now we describe our contributions. We provide an example of a production
economy with externalities and an infinite set of equilibria for all the initial
endowments. The example shows that regularly fails because of the first order
external e!ect on transformation functions. So, in order to avoid situations
such as the one shown by the example, we consider a displacement of the
boundary of the production sets, that is, simple perturbations of the trans-
formation functions. But, as shown by Bonnisseau and del Mercato (2010) in
the case of only consumption externalities, regularity may fail whenever the
second-order external e!ects are too strong. So, the basic assumptions and the
perturbations mentioned above may be not su"cient to control the second-
order external e!ects thereby preventing the regularity result. Thus, we also
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introduce two additional assumptions on the second-order external e!ects.
Our main result is Theorem14 which states that almost all perturbed economies
are regular, where the term almost all means in a open and full measure. 7
As a consequence of Theorem 14, we get Corollary 19 which states the non-
emptiness and the openness of the set of regular economies in the space of
endowments and transformation functions.
Finally, we compare our contribution with previous contributions. As in Chap-
ter 1, we follow Smale’s extended approach. Concerning recent works on public
goods and externalities, Villanacci and Zenginobuz (2005), Kung (2008) and
Bonnisseau and del Mercato (2010) also use Smale’s extended approach. Vil-
lanacci and Zenginobuz (2005) focus on a specific kind of externalities, namely
public goods. In Kung (2008), di!erently from our model, there are no exter-
nalities on the production side. Furthermore, in order to get a regularity result,
the author does not make any additional assumptions on utility functions, but
perturbations of utility functions are also needed. In Bonnisseau and del Mer-
cato (2010), only consumption externalities are considered. So, our regularity
result extends the latter one to the case of production economy.
The model in Mandel (2008) is more general than ours since the author allows
for non-convexity on the production side. But, as stressed in Chapter 1, di!er-
ently from our contribution, the author has to enlarge the commodity space
treating externalities as additional variables. Moreover, the author assumes
that a small change in the externalities created by all the agents on a agent
does not generate changes in the choices of the latter agent which would in turn
involve the exact same change on the behavior of the others, see Assumption
TR2 in Mandel (2008). But, di!erently from our assumptions, Assumption
TR2 involves endogenous variables, more precisely the derivatives of house-
holds’ demands and firms’ supplies. So, this assumption implicitly involves the
Lagrange multipliers, that is the equilibrium prices.
1.3 Chapter 3 – “Testable restrictions in a specific model with externalities
and public goods: The collective consumption model”
As we emphasized in the previous subsection, it is important to study testable
restrictions in general equilibrium models in the presence of externalities.
Testable restrictions on the classical general equilibrium model have been
widely studied in literature, see for example the seminal paper of Brown and
Matzkin (1996), and Chiappori, Ekeland, Kübler and Polemarchakis (2004).
7 See Smale (1981).
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The first testable restrictions in a model that involves externalities and public
goods are provided by Browning and Chiappori (1998) for a collective con-
sumption model. More precisely, the authors consider a non-unitary household
model in which the decisions taken by the two intra-household members are
Pareto e!cient. In the last decades, the collective consumption model for the
analysis of household decisions has become increasingly popular. The reasons
for this interest stand in that individuals within a household are heteroge-
neous (i.e. they have di"erent preferences) and an intra-household decision
process takes place within a household. The standard unitary model considers
a household as a single decision maker who maximizes his preferences sub-
ject to his budget constraint. But, there exists empirical evidence showing
that the unitary model does not hold for household decisions. So, the uni-
tary model is obviously too restrictive, since it implicitly endows households,
rather than individuals, with preferences over consumption goods. In particu-
lar, the well-known properties of the classical demand function and especially
the symmetry of the Slutsky matrix are often rejected. 8
In Browning and Chiappori (1998), one does not observe what goods are pri-
vately consumed and what goods are publicly consumed within the household.
The authors assume that only prices and aggregate demand with respect to
some power distribution between the two intra-household members are ob-
served. Using a “parametric” approach based on di"erentiable techniques, the
authors prove that the aggregate demand is compatible with the Pareto op-
timal decision behavior if it satisfies some restrictions on a “Pseudo-Slutsky”
matrix. The “Pseudo-Slutsky” matrix is the sum of the classical Slutsky ma-
trix which measures the change in demand induced by the variation of prices
and income, and another matrix which measures the change in demand in-
duced by the variation of power distribution. Furthermore, the authors show
that a collective model with two intra-household members can be rejected if
at least five goods are present in the economy.
Successively, Chiappori and Ekeland (2006) generalize the previous model con-
sidering a group with many individuals and production, and provide necessary
and su!cient restrictions in terms of “Pseudo-Slutsky” matrix. Importantly,
using the “parametric” approach, the authors show that the private and
public nature of consumption is not testable. More precisely, the au-
thors show that the collective consumption model has exactly the same testa-
bility implications as two more specific collective models, i.e. a first benchmark
case where all goods are publicly consumed within the household and a sec-
ond benchmark case, without externalities at all, where all goods are privately
consumed within the household.
8 See for example, Browning and Meghir (1991) and Browning and Chiappori
(1998).
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Di!erently from Browning and Chiappori (1998), Cherchye, De Rock, Ver-
meulen (2007) provide a “non-parametric” characterization of the collective
consumption model. The “non-parametric” approach in the tradition of Afriat
(1967) and Varian (1982) contributions. This approach does not rely on any
functional specification regarding the group consumption process, and it typ-
ically focuses on revealed preference axioms (i.e. GARP or related axioms).
In Cherchye, De Rock, Vermeulen (2007), assuming positive externalities the
authors derive necessary and su"cient conditions for a rationalization of a
data set consistent with the collective consumption model. Furthermore, the
authors show that it is su"cient to have a data set with three observations and
three goods to reject collective rationality for a household with two members.
In Chapter 3, using the “non-parametric” restrictions found by Cherchye, De
Rock, Vermeulen (2007), we provide examples showing that the private and
public nature of consumption have testable implications.
So, in contrast with the previous literature, we find that the “non-parametric”
approach does imply testability of privateness versus publicness of consump-
tion, even if one only observes the aggregate group consumption. Furthermore,
we obtain that the case where all the goods are publicly consumed within the
household is independent from the case where all the goods are privately
consumed within the household. More precisely, a data set that satisfies the
restrictions for the first case does not necessarily satisfy the restrictions for
the second case, and vice versa.
How can we interpret this di!erence between the testability conclusions of
our approach and the ones of the “parametric” approach? Our explanation is
that, unlike Chiappori and Ekeland’s approach, our “non-parametric” restric-
tions involve personalized prices à la Lindahl and personalized consumptions,
although we do not require personalized prices and personalized consump-
tions to be observable. Under this view, the nature of the “non-parametric”
approach seems to imply stronger testability restrictions.
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1 Long abstract
We consider a general model of a private ownership economy with consumption
and production externalities. Each firm is characterized by a technology de-
scribed by an inequality on a di!erentiable function called the transformation
function. Each household is characterized by a consumption set, preferences
and an initial endowment of commodities. Each consumption set is described
by an inequality on a di!erentiable function called the possibility function.
Individual preferences are represented by a utility function. Firms are owned
by households. Utility, possibility and transformation functions depend on the
consumption of all households and on the production activities of all firms.
Using Smale’s extended approach and homotopy arguments, under di!erentia-
bility and boundary conditions, we prove the non-emptiness and the compact-
ness of the set of competitive equilibria with consumptions and prices strictly
positive.
1 This chapter is based on del Mercato and Platino (2010).
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The homotopy idea is that any economy with externalities is connected by
an arc to some economy without externalities at all. Along this arc, equilibria
move in a continuous way without sliding o! the boundary. Smale’s extended
approach di!ers from the one based on the aggregate excess demand function
by the feature that equilibria are described in terms of first order conditions
and market clearing conditions. In the presence of externalities, this approach
overcomes the following di"culty: the individual demand functions depend on
the individual demand functions of the others, which depend on the individual
demand functions of the others, and so on. So, it would be impossible to define
an aggregate excess demand function which depends only on prices and initial
endowments.
Chapter 1 is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model and the
assumptions. In Section 3, the concept of competitive equilibrium is adapted
to our economy. Then, we focus on the equilibrium function which is built on
first order conditions associated with households and and firms maximization
problems. In Section 4, we present our main result, Theorem 12.
In Appendix A we provide some technical details. In Appendix B, the reader
can find the characterization of Pareto optimal allocation without externali-
ties.
2 The model and the assumptions
There is a finite number C of physical commodities or goods labeled by
the superscript c ! C := {1, . . . , C}. The commodity space is RC . There
is a finite number H of households or consumers labeled by the subscript
h ! H := {1, . . . , H}. Each household h is characterized by an endowment
of commodities, a possibility function and preferences described by a util-
ity function. There is a finite number J of firms labeled by the subscript
j ! J := {1, . . . , J}. Each firm j is owned by the households and it is char-
acterized by a technology described by a transformation function. Individual
utility, possibility and transformation functions are a!ected by the consump-
tion choices of all households and the production activities of all firms which
represent the externalities created on individual agents (households and firms)
by all the other agents. The notations are summarized below.
• yj := (y1j , .., ycj , .., yCj ) is the production plan of firm j. As usual, the output
components are positive and the input components are negative; y!j :=
(yz)z "=j denotes the production plan of firms other than j and y := (yj)j#J
denotes the production of all the firms.
• xch is the consumption of commodity c by household h;




h ) denotes household h’s consumption; x!h := (xk)k "=h
2
denotes the consumption of households other than h and x := (xh)h!H
denotes the consumption of all the households.
• For each j ! J , the technology of firm j is described by an inequality on a
function tj called the transformation function. This description is usual for
smooth production economies, see for instance Mas-Colell et al. (1995). An
innovation of this chapter comes from the dependency of the production set
with respect to the production activities of other firms and the consumption
of households. That is, given y"j and x, the production set of the firm j is
described by the following set,
Yj(y"j, x) :=
!
yj ! RC : tj(yj, y"j, x) " 0
"
where the transformation function tj is a function from RC#RC(J"1)#RCH++
to R. So, tj describes the way firm j’s technology is a!ected by the actions
of the other agents.
• As in general equilibrium models à la Arrow–Debreu, each household h has
to chose a consumption in his consumption set Xh. Analogously to the pro-
duction side, each consumption set Xh is described in terms of an inequality
on a function !h. 3 We call !h the possibility function of households h. The
main innovation of this chapter comes from the dependency of the consump-
tion set with respect to the consumptions of the other households and the
production activities of firms. So, given x"h and y the consumption set of
household h is given by
Xh(x"h, y) :=
!
xh ! RC++ : !h(xh, x"h, y) " 0
"
where the possibility function !h is a function from RC++ # R
C(H"1)
+ # RCJ
to R. Thus, !h describes the way in which the set of all consumption alter-
natives which are a priori possible for household h is a!ected by the actions
of the other agents.
• Each household h ! H has preferences described by a utility function,
uh : (xh, x"h, y) ! RC++ # R
C(H"1)
+ # RCJ $% uh(xh, x"h, y) ! R
uh(xh, x"h, y) is the utility level of household h associated with (xh, x"h, y).
So, uh describes the way household h’s preferences are a!ected by the con-
sumption and the production of the other agents.
• sjh ! [0, 1] is the share of firm j owned by household h; sh := (sjh)j!J !
[0, 1]J denotes the vector of the shares of all firms owed by household h;
s := (sh)h!H ! [0, 1]JH . The set of all shares is




3 In same spirit, see Smale (1974), and Bonnisseau and del Mercato (2010).
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• ech is the endowment of commodity c owned by household h;




h ) denotes household h’s endowment; e := (eh)h!H.
• E := ((uh,!h, eh, sh)h!H, (tj)j!J ) is an economy.
• pc is the price of one unit of commodity c; p := (p1, .., pc, .., pC) ! RC++;
prices of goods are expressed in units of account.
• Given w = (w1, .., wc, .., wC) ! RC , we denote
w\ := (w1, .., wc, .., wC"1) ! RC"1
We make the following assumptions on the transformation functions (tj)j!J .
Assumption 1 For all j ! J ,
(1) The function tj is a C1 function.
(2) For each (y"j, x) ! RC(J"1) " RCH++ , tj(0, y"j, x) # 0.
(3) For each (y"j, x) ! RC(J"1) " RCH++ , the function tj(·, y"j, x) is di!eren-
tiably strictly decreasing, i.e.
$ (y"j, x) ! RC(J"1) " RCH++ and $ y#j ! RC , Dyj tj(y#j, y"j, x) % 0
(4) For each (y"j, x) ! RC(J"1)"RCH++ , the function tj(·, y"j, x) is C2 and it is
di!erentiably strictly quasi-concave, i.e. for every yj ! RC, D2yj tj(yj, y"j, x)
is negative definite on kerDyj tj(yj, y"j, x).
4
We remark that, given the externalities, the assumptions on tj are standard
in “smooth” general equilibrium models. Indeed, from Point 1 of Assumption
1 the production set is closed and from Point 4 of Assumption 1 it is convex.
Point 2 of Assumption 1 states that inactivity is possible. As usual Point
2 of Assumption 1 implies that for any price system p ! RC++ and for any
given externalities, the optimal profit of firm j is non-negative. 5This property
ensures that every consumer has a positive wealth, since the aggregate profit
is non-negative. Consequently the individual budget constraint is non-empty
for any given externality and price system. Point 3 of Assumption 1 represents
the “free disposal” property.
4 Let v and v# be two vectors in Rn, v · v# denotes the inner product of v and v#.
Let A be a real matrix with m rows and n columns, and B be a real matrix with
n rows and l columns, AB denotes the matrix product of A and B. Without loss of
generality, vectors are treated as row matrices and A denotes both the matrix and
the following linear application A : v ! Rn & A(v) := AvT ! R[m] where vT denotes
the transpose of v and R[m] := {wT : w ! Rm}. When m = 1, A(v) coincides with
the inner product A · v, treating A and v as vectors in Rn.
5 Indeed, by Point 2 of Assumption 1 the production plan 0 is in the production
set of form j whatever are the externalities.
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Define the set Y of all production plans which are in the production sets
whatever are the externalities, that is
Y :=
!
y! ! RCJ | " (x, y) ! RCH++ # RCJ : tj(y!j, y"j, x) $ 0, % j ! J
"
(1)
The following assumption on Y can be interpreted as the asymptotic irre-
versibility and “no free lunch” assumption at the aggregate level.
Assumption 2 If y! ! CY and
#
j#J
y!j $ 0, then y!j = 0 for every j ! J . 6
The assumption above ensures that the set of feasible allocation of the economy
E is bounded. Furthermore, Assumption 2 guarantees that the set of feasible
allocation is bounded for any fixed externalities. As a consequence of this
assumption, one gets the boundedness of the set of feasible allocations along
all the arc associated with the homotopy defined in Subsection 4.2 (see Lemma
16 and Step 2.1 of Lemma 17). One should notice that Assumption 2 is in the
same spirit as Assumption UB (Uniform Boundedness) of Bonnisseau and
Médecin (2001) and Assumption P3 of Mandel (2008).
We make the following assumptions on the utilities functions (uh)h#H.
Assumption 3 For all h ! H,
(1) The function uh is continuous in its domain and it is C1 in the interior
of its domain.
(2) For each (x"h, y) ! RC(H"1)++ #RCJ , the function uh(·, x"h, y) is di!eren-
tiably strictly increasing, i.e.
% (x"h, y) ! RC(H"1)++ # RCJ and % x!h ! RC++, Dxhuh(x!h, x"h, y) & 0
(3) For each (x"h, y) ! RC(H"1)++ #RCJ , the function uh(·, x"h, y) is C2 and it
is di!erentiably strictly quasi-concave, i.e., for every xh ! RC++, D2xhuh(xh, x"h, y)
is negative definite on kerDxhuh(xh, x"h).
(4) For each (x"h, y) ! RC(H"1)+ # RCJ and for each u ! Im uh(·, x"h, y),
clRC{xh ! RC++ : uh(xh, x"h, y) $ u} ' RC++
So, fixing the externalities, the assumptions on uh are standard in “smooth”
general equilibrium models. In Points 1 and 4 of Assumption 3 we consider
consumption x"h in the closure of RC(H"1)++ , just to look at the limit of a
behavior (see Steps 1.2 and 2.2 of Lemma 17).
We make the following assumptions on the possibility functions (!h)h#H.
6 CY denotes the asymptotic cone of Y .
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Assumption 4 For all h ! H,
(1) !h is continuous in its domain and it is C1 in the interior of its domain.
(2) (Convexity of the consumption set) For each (x!h, y) ! RC(H!1)+ " RCJ ,
the function !h(·, x!h, y) is quasi-concave. 7
(3) (Survival consition) There exists xh ! RC++ such that !h(xh, x!h, y) # 0
for every x!h ! RC(H!1)+ and for every y ! RCJ .
(4) (Individual desiderability) (a) For each (x!h, y) ! RC(H!1)+ "RCJ the func-
tion !h(·, x!h, y) is di!erentiable and for every xh ! RC++, Dxh!h(xh, x!h, y) $=
0; (b) for each (x!h, y) ! RC(H!1)++ " RCJ and for every xh ! RC++,
Dxh!h(xh, x!h, y) /! %RC++.
We remark that, fixing the externalities, from Points 1 and 2 of Assumption 4,
one gets the usual assumptions on the closedness and on the convexity of the
consumption set. Point 3 of Assumption 4, is called the “survival condition”
since it guarantees that there exists at least a consumption bundle which
belongs to the consumption set Xh(x!h, y), whatever are the externalities.
Point 4(a) in Assumption 4 means that the consumption set is “smooth” while
Point 4(b) implies that household h can increase the consumption of at least
one commodity remaining in his consumption set. Consequently, according to
Point 2 of Assumption 3 (that is stricly increasing utility functions), Point 4(b)
of Assumption 4 means each household can increase his utility remaining in his
consumption set, from which one classically deduces that the individual budget
constraint is binding. In Assumption 4, we consider consumption bundles x!h
in the closure of RC(H!1)++ , just to look at limit of a behavior (see Proposition
7 which is used in Step 2.2 of Lemma 17).
T denotes the set of t := (tj)j"J satisfying Assumption 1 and Assumption 2,
U denotes the set of u := (uh)h"H satisfying Assumption 3, and X denotes the
set of ! := (!h)h"H satisfying Assumption 4.
Remark 5 From now on, we take u ! U , ! ! X , t ! T and s ! S as
given. So, an economy is complete characterized by the individual endowments
e = (eh)h"H.
We define now the set of endowments which satisfy the Survival Assumption
for given possibility functions. As it is well known, the Survival Assumption
states that each household can dispose of a strictly positive quantity of every
commodity from his initial endowment still remaining in the interior of his
consumption set.
7 Since !h is C1 in the interior of its domain, then for each (x!h, y) ! RC(H!1)++ "
RCJ , the function !h(·, x!h, y) is di!erentiably quasi-concave.
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Definition 6 Let ! ! X . Define the set E! :=
!
h!H
E!h " RCH++ where
E!h :=
"





From Point 3 of Assumption 4, E! is nonempty and it is open by definition.
From Points 3 and 4(a) of Assumption 4, the Survival Assumption is satisfied
on the set E! since for all e ! E! the following property holds true for every
h ! H. 8
$(x"h, y) ! RC(H"1)+ %RCJ , &$xh ! RC++ : !h($xh, x"h, y) > 0 and $xh ' eh (2)
As a direct consequence of Points 1 and 2 of Assumptions 4 and (2) we get the
following proposition. The continuous selection functions given by Proposition
7 will play a fundamental role in the construction of the continuous homotopy
used to show our main result (see Theorem 12). Specifically, we use Proposition
7 to define the homotopies given by (16) and (17).
Proposition 7 For all h ! H, there exists a continuous selection function
$xh : RC(H"1)+ %RCJ %E!h ( RC++ such that for each (x"h, y, eh) ! R
C(H"1)
+ %
RCJ % E!h, !h($xh(x"h, y, eh), x"h, y) > 0 and $xh(x"h, y, eh) ' eh.
3 Competitive equilibrium with externalities
In this section, we first provide the notion of competitive equilibrium associa-
ted with our economy. Second, we define the equilibrium function using the
first order conditions associated with firms and households maximization prob-
lems.
Without loss of generality, commodity C is the numeraire good. So, given
p\ ! RC"1++ with innocuous abuse of notation, we denote p := (p\, 1) ! RC++.
Definition 8 (x#, y#, p#\) ! RCH++ % RCJ % RC"1++ is a competitive equilibrium
for the economy e = (eh)h!H if
8 Let eh ! E!h . Thus, eh = xh + v with xh given by Point 3 of Assumption 4 and
v ) 0. Fix the externalities and consider $xh := xh + !Dxh"h(xh, x"h, y). By Point
4(a) of Assumption 4 and the definition of di!erentiable function, property (2) is
satisfied for some ! > 0.
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subject to tj(yj, y!#j, x
!) " 0
(3)


























In the following propositions, using Karush–Kuhn–Tucker’s conditions we char-
acterize the solutions of firms and households maximization problems.
Proposition 9 Given y!#j ! RC(J#1), x! ! RCH++ and p!\ ! RC#1++ ,
(1) if y!j is a solution to problem (3), then it is the unique solution.
(2) y!j ! RC is the solution to problem (3) if and only if there exists "!j ! R++
such that (y!j ,"
!











Proposition 10 Given eh ! E!h, x!#h ! R
C(H#1)
++ , y
! ! RCJ and p!\ ! RC#1++ ,





j " 0, then there exists a unique solution to problem (4).
(2) x!h ! RC++ is the solution to problem (4) if and only if there exists
(#!h, µ
!








!)% #hp! + µhDxh!h(xh, x!#h, y!) = 0














Define the set of endogenous variables as
! :=
!







with generic element ! := (x,", µ, y,#, p\) := ((xh,"h, µh)h"H, (yj,#j)j"J , p\).
We can now describe equilibria using the propositions above and market clear-
ing conditions (5). One should notice that, due to the Walras law and the
second equation in (7), the market clearing condition for commodity C is “re-
dundant”. Therefore, in the following remark we omit in (5) the condition for
commodity C.
Remark 11 !# = (x#,"#, µ#, y#,##, p#\) " ! is an extended competitive equi-





h, ) solves system (7) for all h " H,
(2) (y#j ,#
#
j ) solves system (6) for all j " J ,










For a given economy e " E!, the equilibrium function Fe : ! $ Rdim!,
Fe (!) := ((F
h.1
e (!) , F
h.2




e (!) , F
j.2
e (!))j"J , F
M
e (!)) (8)
is defined by F h.1e (!) := Dxhuh(xh, x!h, y)# "hp+ µhDxh$h(xh, x!h, y),
F h.2e (!) := #p · (xh # eh #
#
j"J
sjhyj), F h.3e (!) := min {µh,$h(xh, x!h, y)},
F j.1e (!) := p + #jDyj tj(yj, y!j, x), F
j.2











By Remark 11, !# " ! is an extended equilibrium for the economy e " E!
if and only if Fe (!#) = 0. With innocuous abuse of terminology, we call !#
simply an equilibrium.
4 Existence of competitive equilibria
In this section we prove our main result, that is competitive equilibria with
consumptions and prices strictly positive exist, and the set of equilibria is
compact.
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Theorem 12 (Existence and compactness) Given (u,!, t) ! U "X " T
and s ! S, for each economy e ! E!, the set of equilibria is non-empty and
compact.
In order to prove Theorem 12, following the seminal paper by Smale (1974),
we use homotopy arguments, namely Theorem 13 which is a consequence of
the homotopy invariance of the topological degree. More specifically, following
Chapter 4 of Milnor (1965), Theorem 13 is based on the topological degree
theory of degree mod 2. The reader can find a survey of this approach in
Villanacci et al. (2002). The theory of degree mod 2 is simpler than the one
used in Mas-Colell (1985) that requires the concepts of oriented manifold and
the associated topological degree – the Brouwer degree – in order to deduce
the existence result from regularity properties of equilibria and from the Index
Formula.
Theorem 13 (Homotopy Theorem) Let M and N be two C2 boundaryless
manifolds of the same dimension, y ! N and f, g : M # N be such that: 1.
f and g are C0; 2. #g!1(y) is odd, and g is C1 in an open neighborhood of
g!1(y); 3. y is a regular value for g; 4. there exists a continuous homotopy
L from g to f such that L!1(y) is compact. Then, f!1(y) is compact and
f!1(y) $= %.
To apply Theorem 13, we consider the equilibrium function Fe defined in
Section 3 which plays the role of the function f . In order to construct the
required homotopy and the function that will play the role of the function g,
we proceed as follows. First, we construct the so called “test economy”. The
test economy will be built using a Pareto optimal allocation of an appropriate
production economy à la Arrow–Debreu without externalities at all. Second, we
construct the equilibrium function G associated to the test economy playing
the role of the function g. Finally, we provide the required homotopy He from
G to Fe playing the role of L.
The test economy and the equilibrium function G are defined in Subsection
4.1. The homotopy He is given in Subsection 4.2. In Subsection 4.3, we verify
that all the assumptions of Theorem 13 are satisfied. More specifically, G!1(0)
is a singleton, G is C1 in an open neighborhood of G!1(0), 0 is a regular value
of G and H!1e (0) is compact.
One should notice that, as a consequence of the properties above, one gets
that degree mod 2 of G is equal to 1. Since the homotopy He is continuous
and H!1e (0) is compact, the homotopy invariance of the topological degree
implies that the degree mod 2 of the equilibrium function Fe is equal to 1.
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4.1 Test economy
In order to construct the test economy, fixing the externalities, we first consider
a Pareto optimal allocation of a standard production economy à la Arrow–
Debreu. Second, we construct the equilibrium function G using the Second
Welfare Theorem in such a way that, at the test economy, the equilibrium
exists and it is unique.
Let x := (xh)h!H ! RCH++ be an arbitrary consumption and y := (yj)j!J ! RCJ
be an arbitrary production. Fixing the externalities at (x, y), define uh(xh) :=
uh(xh, x"h, y), tj(yj) := tj(yj, y"j, x), and the corresponding production eco-
nomy à la Arrow–Debreu, namely




where all the consumption sets coincide with the strictly positive orthant of
the commodity space, that is Xh = RC++. Since there are no externalities at all,
the notions of feasibility and Pareto optimality are standard. It is well known
that, under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, there exists a Pareto optimal allocation
of the economy E , denoted by
("x, "y) ! RCH++ " RCJ
and there exist Lagrange multipliers ("!, ", "#) = (("!h)h #=1, ", ( "#j)j!J ) ! RH"1++ "





Dx1u1(x1, x"1, y)# " = 0
!hDxhuh(xh, x"h, y)# " = 0, $ h %= 1
uh(xh, x"h, y)# uh("xh, x"h, y) = 0, $ h %= 1
" + #jDyj tj(yj, y"j, x) = 0, $ j ! J











It is well known that the Pareto optimal allocation ("x, "y) can be supported by
some price system "p. That is, using Debreu’s vocabulary, ("x, "y) is an equilib-
rium relative to some price system "p. 10 From system (10), one easily deduces
9 For a formal proof, see Appendix B.
10 See Section 6.4 of Debreu (1959).
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below the supporting price !p and the equilibrium equations satisfied by (!x, !y)
for appropriate Lagrange multipliers.





Dxhuh(!xh, x"h, y)# !!h!p = 0, $ h ! H
!p · !xh = !p · (!eh +
&
j!J
sjh!yj), $ h ! H
!p+ !"jDyj tj(!yj, y"j, x) = 0, $ j ! J












!!1 := !#C , !!h :=
!#C
!$h











We call test economy the economy defined below
!E := ((RC++, uh, !eh, sh)h!H, (tj)j!J )
The test economy !E is a standard private ownership economy à la Arrow–
Debreu with no externalities at all. By system (11), since Karush–Kuhn–
Tucker conditions are su!cient to solve the classical firms and households
maximization problems, (!x, !!, !y, !", !p\) is a competitive equilibrium for the
economy !E . Importantly, as will be shown in Lemma 14 of Subsection 4.3, the
economy !E has a unique equilibrium. 11
Using the Pareto optimal allocation (!x, !y) and the Lagrange multipliers defined
above, consider the vector
!& := (!x, !!, !µ, !y, !", !p\) ! " (13)
11 One should notice that the endowments given by (12) are not necessarily posi-






and !eh = !sjh
'
h!H eh. But, in the latter case, the
uniqueness of the equilibrium is not so obvious since the redistribution depends on
the supporting price and on the Pareto optimal consumption allocation. For details,
see the proof of Lemma 14.
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where !µh = 0 for all h ! H. In a natural way, from system (11), one deduces
the equilibrium function G satisfying G(!!) = 0. The function G : ! " Rdim!,
G (!) := ((Gh.1 (!) , Gh.2 (!) , Gh.3 (!))h!H, (G
j.1 (!) , Gj.2 (!))j!J , G
M (!))
(14)




sjhyj), Gh.3 (!) := min {µh,#h(#xh(x"h, y, eh), x"h, y)}, Gj.1 (!) := p +
$jDyj tj(yj, y"j, x), G










e\h. We remark that the continuous function #xh is given by Proposition 7
and Gh.3(!!) = !µh = 0 since #h(#xh(x"h, y, eh), x"h, y) > 0.
4.2 The homotopy
The basic idea is to homotopize endowments and externalities by an arc from
the equilibrium conditions given in the economy !E to the ones associated to
our economy E . But, one finds the following di"culty.
At equilibrium, the individual wealth is positive at the beginning and at the
end of the arc. Indeed, in the economy !E , the budget constraint in system
(11) and the endowment defined by (12) imply that the individual wealth
!p · !xh is positive. In the economy E , the individual wealth is also positive
by inactivity assumption and standard arguments from profit maximization.
But, the individual wealth might not be positive along the homotopy arc, and
consequently the individual budget constraint might be empty. We illustrate
the reason below.
If one homotopizes the endowments, then the individual wealth is given by
p · [%eh + (1# %)!eh] + p ·
"
j!J
sjhyj which is by (12) equal to
p · [%eh + (1# %)!xh] + p ·
"
j!J
sjh[yj # (1# %)!yj] (15)
So, the individual wealth is positive if p · yj $ p · (1 # %)!yj for every j ! J .
Using standard arguments from profit maximization, this condition is satisfied
if the production plan (1 # %)!yj belongs to the production set of firm j. On
the other hand, if, at the same time, one homotopizes the externalities, then
the production set along the arc is given by
Yj(%y"j + (1# %)y"j, %x+ (1# %)x)
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But, one cannot be sure that the production plan (1 ! !)!yj belongs to the
production set above. Consequently, the individual wealth given by (15) might
not be positive.
Thus, to overcome this di!culty, we will define the homotopy Hein two times
by two homotopies. Namely, in the first homotopy "e, we homotopize the
initial endowments, and in the second homotopy #e we homotopize the exter-
nalities in the production sets. Finally, we remark that if one assume strong
convexity assumption on the production set Yj, i.e. the function tj is quasi-
concave also with respect to externalities, one does not need two homotopies
since initial endowments and externalities can be homotopized at the same
time.
Define the following convex combinations
x(!) := !x+ (1! !)x
y(!) := !y + (1! !)y
eh(!) := !eh + (1! !)!eh
and the following two homotopies, "e : $" [0, 1] # Rdim! defined by
"e (", !) := (("h.1e (", !) ,"
h.2
e (", !) ,"
h.3
e (", !))h!H, ("
j.1
e (", !) ,"
j.2
e (", !))j!J ,"
M
e (", !))
"h.1e (", !) := Dxhuh(xh, x"h(!), y(!))! #hp




"h.3e (", !) := min {µh,$h(#xh(x"h, y, eh), x"h, y)}
"j.1e (", !) := p+ %jDyj tj(yj, y"j, x)
"j.2e (", !) := tj(yj, y"j, x)











and #e : $" [0, 1] # Rdim! defined by
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!e (!, ") := ((!h.1e (!, ") ,!
h.2
e (!, ") ,!
h.3
e (!, "))h!H, (!
j.2
e (!, ") ,!
j.2
e (!, "))j!J ,!
M
e (!, "))
!h.1e (!, ") := Dxhuh(xh, x"h, y)! #hp +
"µhDxh$h("xh + (1! ")!xh(x"h, y, eh), x"h, y)




!h.3e (!, ") := min {µh,$h("xh + (1! ")!xh(x"h, y, eh), x"h, y)}
!j.1e (!, ") := p+ %jDyj tj (yj, y"j("), x("))
!j.2e (!, ") := tj (yj, y"j("), x("))











where the continuous function !xh is given by Proposition 7.





#e(!, 2&) if 0 $ & $ 12
!e(!, 2& ! 1) if 12 $ & $ 1
(18)
Observe thatHe is a continuous function. Indeed, #e and !e are continuous be-
cause they are composed by continuous functions (see Point 1 of Assumptions




is well defined since
#e(!, 1) = !e(!, 0)
Finally, observe that
He (!, 0) = #e (!, 0) = G(!) and He (!, 1) = !e (!, 1) = Fe (!)
4.3 Properties of the homotopy
To verify the assumptions of Theorem 13, we provide the three following lem-
mas, namely Lemmas 14, 15 and 17.
Lemma 14 G"1(0) = {)!} where )! is given by (13), and G is C1 in an open
neighborhood of )!.
Proof. By (11) and (14), )! % G"1(0). Let !# % " be such that G(!#) = 0, we
show that !# = )!.
15









We first prove that (x"", y"") is a feasible allocation of the economy E defined
by (9). Indeed, since Gj.2(!!) = Gj.2(!!) = 0 and the function tj(·, y#j, x) is
strictly quasi-concave (see Point 4 of Assumption 1), we get
tj(y
""
j , y#j, x) > 0, " j # J (19)

























Since (!x, !y) is a Pareto optimal allocation, from the last equation of system



























e\h] which is equal to zero by



















Thus, (19) and (20) imply that (x"", y"") is a feasible allocation of E .
Second, we show that for all h # H,
uh(x
!
h, x#h, y) % uh(!xh, x#h, y) (21)
Indeed, by (12) Gh.1(!!) = Gh.2(!!) = 0 and Karush-Kuhn-Tucker su!cient




subject to p! · xh & p! · !xh +
"
j$J
!sjh p! · (y!j $ !yj)
Notice that !xh belongs to the budget constraint of the problem above since"
j$J
sjhp
! ·(y!j$ !yj) % 0. Indeed, from Gj.1(!!) = Gj.2(!!) = 0 and Karush-Kuhn-




subject to tj(yj, y#j, x) % 0
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From Gj.2(!!) = 0, !yj belongs to constraint set of the problem above, and so
p! · (y!j ! !yj) " 0. Therefore, (21) is completely proved.
Finally, (21) and the strict quasi-concavity of uh(·, x"h, y) (see Point 3 of
Assumption 3) imply that for all h # H
uh(x
##
h , x"h, y) > min{uh(x!h, x"h, y), uh(!xh, x"h, y)} = uh(!xh, x"h, y)
which contradicts the Pareto optimality of (!x, !y).
Claim 2. ("!, µ!,#!, p!\) = (!", !µ, !#, !p\). By Gh.1(!!) = Gh.1(!!) = 0, we get
"!h = DxCh uh(x
!
h, x"h, y) = DxCh uh(
!xh, x"h, y) = !"h










Proposition 7 and Gh.3(!!) = Gh.3(!!) = 0 imply µ!h = 0 = !µh. By G
j.1(!!) =








Dycj tj(!yj, y"j, x)
= !#j
Claim 3. G is C1 in a open neighborhood of G"1(0) = !!. Since $h and "x are
continuous functions, the function gh defined below is continuous
gh : ! # ! % gh : (!) := ($h("xh(x"h, y, eh), x"h, y)! µh) # R
For all h # H, gh(!!) > 0 since $h("xh(!x"h, !y, eh), !x"h, !y) > 0 and !µh = 0. Thus,
in some open neighborhood I(!!) & ! of !! we get gh(!) > 0 for all h # H.
Therefore, in the open neighborhood I(!!), the component Gh.3(!) = µh for all
h # H while the components Gh.1(!), Gh.2(!), Gj.1(!), Gj.2(!) and GM(!) are
given by (14). So, G(!) is obviously a C1 function in I(!!).
Lemma 15 D!G(!!) has rank dim!.
Proof. The computation of D!G(!!) is described below,








In order to prove that D!G(!!) has full rank, we show that if D!G(!!)(!) = 0




(h.1) D2xhuh(!xh, x!h, y)(!xh)!!"h!p!
!"h &IT (!p\) = 0 " h # H
(h.2) !p · (
'
j"J
sjh!yj)! !p ·!!xh = 0 " h # H
(h.3) !µh = 0 " h # H
(j.1) !#jD2yj tj(!yj, y!j, x)(!yj) +!#jDyj tj(!yj, y!j, x) +
&IT (!p\) = 0 " j # J









We first prove that if !xh = 0 for every h # H, then ! = 0. In this case,
Equation (h.1) in system (22) becomes !!p·!"h!"h &IT (!p\) = 0. Considering
commodity C, we obtain !"h = 0 for all h # H. So, !!"h &IT (!p\) = 0 implies




!#jD2yj tj(!yj, y!j, x) Dyj tj(!yj, y!j, x)
T















Since tj(·, y!j, x) is strictly quasi-concave, (see Point 4 of Assumption 1), and
Dyj tj(yj, y!j, x) $= 0, (Point 3 of Assumption 1), the following matrix has full
rank. 12 (
)*
!#jD2yj tj(!yj, y!j, x) Dyj tj(!yj, y!j, x)
T
Dyj tj(!yj, y!j, x) 0
+
,-
12 A di!erentiably strictly quasi-concave function with gradient di!erent from zero
has the bordered Hessian with determinant di!erent from zero.
xh !h µh yj "j p\
Dxhuh(xh)! !hp D2xhuh(!xh) !!p
T !!!h&IT
!p · [xh ! !eh !
'
j"J
sjh(yj ! !yj)] !!p !psjh
µh 1














Therefore, (!yj,!!j) = (0, 0) by (23). So, one gets ! = 0.
Second, we prove that !xh = 0 for every h ! H.







(!xh) < 0 (24)
Multiplying both sides of Gj.1("#) = 0 by sjh!yj, we get
"p · sjh!yj +Dyj tj("yj, y"j, x) · sjh!yj = 0 (25)
So, "p · sjh!yj = 0 by equation (j.2) in system (22). Summing over j, for each
h ! H, one gets "p · (
!
j!J
sjh!yj) = 0 which implies
"p ·!xh = 0 (26)
by equation (h.2) in system (22). Multiplying Gh.1("#) = 0 by !xh, one obtains
Dxhuh("xh, x"h, y) ·!xh = 0




(!xh) # 0, $ h ! H
with a strict inequality for h, since !xh "= 0. Summing over h, one obtains
(24).




!x\h) < 0 (27)
From (26), multiplying (h.1) in system (22) by
!xh
""h












Thus, (27) follows from (24).
Finally, we show below that !p\ ·(
!
h!H
!x\h) % 0 which leads to a contradiction
taking into account (27), and consequently !xh = 0 for all h ! H which
complete the proof of the lemma.
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By (j.2) in system (22), multiplying (j.1) in system (22) by !yj and summing
over j one has !p\ · (
!
j!J
!y\j ) = !
!
j!J







"!j!yjD2yj tj("yj, y"j, x)(!yj)
Therefore, !p\ · (
!
h!H
!x\h) " 0 since tj(·, y"j, x) is strictly quasi-concave (see
Point 4 of Assumption 1).
Lemma 16 For each r # RC++, the following sets are bounded.
At,r :={(x#, y#) # RCH++ $ RCJ | % (x, y) # RCH++ $ RCJ : tj(y#j, y"j, x) " 0
















Proof. We prove that At,r is bounded. Consequently, Āt,r is bounded since it
is included in At,r. Let (x#, y#) # At,r. Since x#h ( 0 for every h # H, we have
that x# is bounded from below by zero. Therefore for every h # H
0 ) x#h )
!
h!H




Thus, to show that At,r is bounded it is enough to prove that the set Y *Mr
is bounded where the set Y is defined by (1) and
Mr := {y# # RCJ :
!
j!J
y#j + r " 0}
Since a subset of Rn is bounded if and only if its asymptotic cone is reduced to
zero, we show now that C(Y *Mr) = {0}. One should notice that C(Y *Mr) +
CY *CMr. 13 Since the asymptotic cone of a set is immune to translation, we
get CMr = CM0, where M0 := {y# # RCJ :
!
j!J
y#j " 0}. M0 is a closed cone
with vertex 0, thus CM0 = M0. So, in order to prove that CY *CMr we have
to show that CY *M0 = {0} which directly follows from Assumption 2.
13 Let (Bi)i!I + Rn be a family of subsets of Rn, C(*i!IBi) + *i!ICBi.
20
Lemma 17 For each e ! E!, H!1e (0) is compact.
Proof. Let e ! E!. Observe that H!1e (0) = !!1e (0) " "!1e (0). Since the union
of a finite number of compact sets is compact, it is enough to show that !!1e (0)
and "!1e (0) are compact.
Claim 1. !!1e (0) is compact.
We prove that, up to a subsequence, every sequence (!" , " ")""N # !!1e (0) con-
verges to an element of !!1e (0), where !
" := (x" ,#" , µ" , y" ,$" , p" \)""N. First
observe that, since {" " : % ! N} # [0, 1], up to a subsequence, (" ")""N con-
verges to some " # ! [0, 1]. From Steps 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4 below, we have that
up to a subsequence, (!")""N converges to some !# := (x#,##, µ#, y#,$#, p# \) !
#. Since the homotopy !e is continuous, taking the limit, we get the desired
result, that is (!#, " #) ! !!1e (0).
Step 1.1. Up to a subsequence, (x" , y")""N converges to some (x#, y#) ! RCH+ $
RCJ . We first prove that the sequence (x" , y")""N belongs to the set Āt,r given
by (29) of Lemma 16. Using a similar strategy as in Claim 1 of Lemma 14, by
(12), !h.2e (!
" , " ") = 0 and !Me (!









eh, & % ! N
So, (x" , y")""N # Āt,r by !j.2e (!" , " ") = 0. Consequently, the sequence (x" , y")""N
belongs to cl Āt,r which is compact by Lemma 16. Up to a subsequence,
(x" , y")""N converges to some (x#, y#) ! cl Āt,r # RCH+ $ RCJ , and thus
(x#, y#) ! RCH+ $ RCJ .
Step 1.2. The consumption allocation x# is strictly positive, i.e. x# ' 0.
The proof is based on Point 4 of Assumption 3. By (12) and !h.1e (!
" , " ") =
!h.2e (!












j % (1% " ")"yj)
(30)
We claim first that for every % ! N, the point
" "eh + (1% " ")"xh (31)
belongs to the budget constraint of the problem above. By !j.1e (!
" , " ") =
!j.2e (!
" , " ") = 0 and Karush–Kuhn–Tucker su$cient conditions, y"j solves the
14 Karush–Kuhn–Tucker conditions are su!cient to solve problem (30).
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subject to tj(yj, y"j, x) " 0
(32)
Since inactivity is possible, tj(0, y"j, x) " 0 by Point 2 of Assumption 1. Since
(!x, !y) is a Pareto optimal allocation, tj(!yj, y"j, x) = 0 by system (10). Since
tj(·, y"j, x) is strictly quasi-concave, we get
tj("
!0 + (1# " !)!yj, y"j, x) = tj((1# " !)!yj, y"j, x) " 0
So, the production plan (1 # " !)!yj belongs to the constraint set of problem






j # (1# " !)!yj) " 0
which completes the proof of the claim.
We claim now that x#h belongs to the closure of some upper contour set. Ob-






!), y!(" !)) " uh(" !eh + (1# " !)!xh, x!"h(" !), y!(" !))
By Point 2 of Assumption 3, for every # > 0 we have that
uh(x
!
h + #1, x
!
"h("
!), y!(" !)) > uh("
!eh + (1# " !)!xh, x!"h(" !), y!(" !))
where 1 := (1, . . . , 1) ! RC++. So, taking the limit for ! $ +% and using the
continuity of uh given by Point 1 of Assumption 3, we get
uh(x
#
h + #1, x
#
"h("
#), y#(" #)) " uh(" #eh + (1# " #)!xh, x#"h(" #), y#(" #)) := u
That is, for every # > 0 the point (x#h + #1) belongs to the following set
{xh ! RC++ : uh(xh, x#"h(" #), y#(" #)) " u}
So, the point x#h belongs to the closure of set above which is included in RC++
by Point 4 of Assumption 3. Therefore, x#h ! RCH++ . One should notice that,
since " # ! [0, 1], x#"h(" #) is not necessarily strictly positive. For that reason,
in Point 4 of Assumption 3 we consider x"h in RC(H"1)+ .
Step 1.3. Up to a subsequence, ($! , p! \)!!N converges to some ($#, p# \) !





j , y"j, x)
, ' ! ! N
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Taking the limit for ! ! +" and using the continuity of Dtj and the “free






j , y#j, x)
> 0
By !j.1e (#
! , $ !) = 0, for every commodity c $= C and for all ! % N we have
p! c = #"!jDycj tj(y
!
j , y#j, x)
Taking the limit and using Points 1 and 3 of Assumption 1, for all c $= C we
get
p" c = #""jDycj tj(y
"
j , y#j, x) > 0
Therefore, p" \ % RC#1++ .
Step 1.4. Up to a subsequence, (%! , µ!)!!N converges to some (%", µ") % RH++&
RH+ . By !h.3e (#! , $ !) = 0 and Proposition 7, we have µ!h = 0 for every ! % N.
Taking the limit, we get µ"h = 0.
By !h.1e (#
! , $ !) = 0, considering commodity C, for every ! % N we get






Taking the limit and using the continuity of Duh (see Point 1 of Assumption
3) we have






which is strictly positive since fixing the externalities the function uh is strictly
increasing (see Point 2 of Assumption 3).
Claim 2. "#1e (0) is compact.
Let (#! , $ !)!!N be a sequences in "#1e (0). As in Claim 1, ($
!)!!N converges
to $ " % [0, 1]. From Seps 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 below, we have that, up to a
subsequence, (#!)!!N converges to an element #
" := (x",%", µ", y","", p"\) % #.
Since "e is a continuous function, taking limit one gets (#", $ ") % "#1e (0).
Step 2.1. Up to a subsequence, (x! , y!)!!N converges to some (x", y") % RCH+ &






!), x!($ !)) = 0
Summing "h.2e (#
! , $ !) = 0 over h, by "Me (#









eh for all ! % N. Therefore, (x! , y!)!!N belongs to the set At,r given by (28).
Consequently, the sequence (x! , y!)!!N belongs to clAt,r which is compact by
23
Lemma 16. So, up to a subsequence, (x! , y!)!!N converges to some (x", y") !
clAt,r " RCH+ # RCJ , and thus (x", y") ! RCH+ # RCJ .
Step 2.2. The consumption allocation x" is strictly positive, i.e. x" $ 0. The
argument is similar to the one used in Step 1.2 of Claim 1. It su!ces to replace








!xh + (1% " !)!xh(x!#h, y! , eh), x!#h, y!) & 0






according to "h.1e (#
! , " !) = "h.2e (#
! , " !) = "h.3e (#
! , " !) = 0,
(2) the point given by (31) with !xh(x!#h, y
! , eh) given by Proposition 7,




subject to tj(yj, y!#j("
!), x!(" !)) & 0
(33)
according to "j.1e (#
! , " !) = "j.2e (#
! , " !) = 0.
Next, as in Step 1.2 of Claim 1 one easily shows that x"h belongs to the closure
of {xh ! RC++ : uh(xh, x"#h, y") & u := uh(!xh(x"#h, y", eh), x"#h, y")}. One should
notice that although x"#h may not be positive, Assumption 4 and consequently
Proposition 7 ensure that !xh(x"#h, y
", eh) is well defined and strictly positive.
Step 2.3. Up to a subsequence, ($! , p! \)!!N converges to some ($", p" \) !
RJ++ # RC#1++ . Using Points 1 and 3 of Assumption 1, the proof is similar to
the one of Step 1.3 in Claim 1.
Step 2.4. Up to a subsequence, (%! , µ!)!!N converges to some (%", µ") ! RH++#
RH+ . We have two possible cases, in Case a), " " = 0, and in Case b), " " ! (0, 1].
Case a). " " = 0. Using "h.3e (#
! , " !) = 0, we first claim that there exists &" ! N
such that for every & & &",
µ!h = 0
Since " " = 0, the sequence
(" !x!h + (1% " !)!xh(x!#h, y! , eh), x!#h, y!)!!N
converges to (!xh(x"#h, y
", eh), x"#h, y







So, the continuity of the functions !xh and !h (see Proposition 7 and Point 1
of Assumption 4) imply that there is "! ! N such that for every " " "!,
!h(#
!x!h + (1# # !)!xh(x!"h, y! , eh), x!"h, y!) > 0
which proves the claim. Thus, the sequence (µ!h)!#N converges to µ
!
h = 0.
By !h.1e ($, #) = 0, considering commodity C, we get %
!






for every " " "!. Taking the limit and using the continuity of Duh (Point 1
of Assumption 3), we get






which is strictly positive by Point 2 of Assumption 3.
Case b). # ! ! (0, 1]. We first claim that up to a subsequence, (%! , µ!)!#N $
RH++ % RH+ converges to some (%!, µ!) ! RH+ % RH+ . Second, we show that
%! & 0.
In order to prove the claim above, it is enough to show that (%!h, µ
!
h)!#N is
bounded for every h ! H. Otherwise, suppose that there is a subsequence
that without loss of generality we continue to denote with (%!h, µ
!
h)!#N such
that '(%!h, µ!h)' diverges to +(. Consider the following sequence in the sphere
















converges to some (%h, µh) )= (0, 0). 16
Obviously, %h " 0 and µh " 0, since %!h > 0 and µ!h " 0 for all " ! N.
Dividing both sides of !h.1e ($
! , # !) = 0 by '(%!h, µ!h)', and taking the limit, we
get
%hp
! = # !µhDxh!h(#
!x!h + (1# # !)!xh(x!"h, y!, eh), x!"h, y!) (34)
Notice that µh > 0 and %h > 0. Indeed from Point 4(a) of Assumption 4, we
know that
Dxh!h(#
!x!h + (1# # !)!xh(x!"h, y!, eh), x!"h, y!) )= 0
Thus, µh > 0 because if µh = 0, from (34) we get %h = 0 which contradicts
the fact that (%h, µh) )= (0, 0). Finally, µh > 0, # ! > 0, p! ! RC++ and (34)
imply %h > 0.
15 Since '(!!h, µ!h)!#N' diverges to +( , without loosing of generality, we suppose
that '(!!h, µ!h)' > 0 for every ".
16 Observe that (!h, µh) )= (0, 0) since '(!h, µh)' = 1.
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We prove now that
!hp
! · !xh(x!"h, y!, eh) < !hp! · x!h (35)
Since !h > 0, Proposition 7 implies that
!hp
! · !xh(x!"h, y!, eh) < !hp! · eh (36)
Multiplying !h.2e ("




! · x!h. Thus, dividing both sides by "(!!h, µ!h)" and taking the
limit, we get
!hp






! · x!h (37)








The inequality above follows by !j.1e ("
! , # !) = !j.2e ("
! , # !) = 0 and the possibi-
lity of inactivity (Point 2 of Assumption 1). Indeed, Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
su"cient conditions imply that y!j solves problem (33), and consequently p
! ·
y!j # 0 for every $ ! N. Multiplying both sides by !!h, dividing by "(!!h, µ!h)"
and taking the limit, we get !hp! · y!j # 0 for every j ! J .
Finally, we show that
!hp
! · !xh(x!"h, y!, eh) # !hp! · x!h (38)
which combined with (35) leads to a contradiction. Therefore, our claim is
completely proved.
Since µh > 0, there exists n ! N such that µ!h > 0 for every $ # n. From
!h.3e ("
! , # !) = 0, we get %h(# !x!h + (1 $ # !)!xh(x!"h, y! , eh), x!"h, y!) = 0 for
every $ # n. Taking the limit, one gets
%h(#
!xh + (1$ # !)!xh(x!"h, y!, eh), x!"h, y!) = 0
Therefore, (34) and the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker su"cient conditions imply that






!xh + (1$ # !)!xh(x!"h, y!, eh), x!"h, y!) # 0
(39)
By Proposition 7, !xh(x!"h, y
!, eh) belongs to the constraint of this problem,
and so (38) holds true.
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Therefore, one concludes that the sequence (!!h, µ
!
h)!!N is bounded, and con-
sequently it admits a subsequence converging to some (!", µ") ! RH+ " RH+ .








"x"h+(1$ # ")!xh(x"#h, y", eh), x"#h, y")
Since µ"h % 0, by Point 2 of Assumption 3 and Point 4 of Assumption 4, we
have
!"hp






"x"h+(1$# ")!xh(x"#h, y", eh), x"#h, y") > 0
for some commodity c. Since p" c > 0, !"h > 0 which completes the proof of
the step.
Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 7. For all h ! H, the correspondence %h : RC(H#1)+ "
RCJ " E"h ! RC++ defined by
%h(x#h, y, , eh) := {xh ! RC++ : $h(xh, x#h, y) > 0 and xh & eh}
is non-empty convex valued by (2) and by Point 2 of Assumption 4. From
Point 1 of Assumption 4, for all xh ! RC++, the following set
%#1h (xh) := {(x#h, y, eh) ! R
C(H#1)
+ "RCJ"E"h : $h(xh, x#h, y, ) > 0 and xh & eh}
is open in RC(H#1)+ "RCJ"E"h . Moreover, R
C(H#1)
+ "RCJ"E"h equipped with
the metric induced by the Euclidean distance is metrizable, thus paracompact.
Then, we have the desired result since the correspondence %h satisfies all the
assumptions of Michael’s Selection Theorem. 17
Proof of Proposition 9. Since the externalities are fixed, the proof is stan-
dard as in the case without externalities.
Proof of Proposition 10. By (2), that is the Survival Assumption, there
exists !xh such that $h(!xh, x"#h, y





j % 0, then
!xh belongs to the constraint set of problem (4). In order to apply Weierstrass’s
17 See Florenzano (2003), Proposition 1.5.1, page 29.
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subject to !h(xh, x"#h, y
") ! 0







") ! uh("xh, x"#h, y")
(40)
It is an easy matter to show that problems (4) and (40) are equivalent. Further-
more, by the continuity of the functions uh and !h (see Point 1 of Assumptions
3 and 4) and by Point 4 of Assumption 3, the constraint set associated with
problem (40) is a compact set included in RC++. Since uh(·, x"#h, y") is continu-
ous, from Weierstrass’s theorem, a solution of problem (40) exists, and it also
a solution to problem (4).
The solution to problem (4) is unique, since the objective function is strictly
quasi-concave (see Point 3 of Assumption 3), !h(·, x"#h, y") is quasi-concave
(see Point 2 of Assumption 4) and the budget set is convex. So, point (1) is
completely proved.
Point (2) follows showing that problem (4) satisfies the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker




j ) and g
2(xh) := !h(xh, x"#h, y
"). Karush-Kuhn-Tucker necessary con-
ditions are satisfied. Indeed, Slater’s condition holds true since g1("xh) > 0,
g2("xh) > 0, and g1 and g2 are pseudo-concave. 18 By Point 2 of Assumption
3 and Point 4(b) of Assumption 4, the Lagrange multiplier ""h associated to
the budget constraint is strictly positive. Karush-Kuhn-Tucker su!cient con-
ditions are satisfied. Indeed, uh(·, x"#h, y") is pseudo-concave, and g1 and g2
are quasi-concave. 19
Finally, using Point 4 of Assumption 4 and Proposition 7, one shows the
uniqueness of the Lagrange multipliers. 20
Appendix B
Characterization of Pareto optimality without externalities
18 Since g1 is linear, it is pseudo-concave. From Points 2 and 4(a) of Assumption 4,
g2 is quasi-concave with gradient di!erent from zero, then it is pseudo-concave.
19 From Point 3 of Assumption 3, uh(·, x"#h, y") is di!erentiable strictly quasi-
concave, then it is pseudo-concave. Since g1 is linear, it is quasi-concave. Finally,
from Point 2 of Assumption 4, g2 is quasi-concave.
20 For additional details, we refer to the proof of Proposition 5 in del Mercato (2006).
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Let E := ((RC++, uh)h!H, (tj)j!J , r) be the economy defined by (9) where r :=!
h!H
eh. Define the following sets
Ur := {(uh)h!H !
"






yj ' r and uh(xh) $ uh % h ! H}
#Ur := {(uh)h "=1 !
"
h "=1 Im uh : " u1 ! Im u1, (u1, (uh)h "=1) ! Ur}
By Point 2 of Assumption 1, the set Āt,r defined by (29) is non-empty. Thus,





subject to tj(yj) $ 0 for every j ! J







Proposition 18 There exists a unique solution ($x, $y) to problem (41).
Proof. In order to apply Weierstrass’ Theorem, one replaces problem (41)




subject to tj(yj) $ 0 for every j ! J








where u#1 ! Im u1 is given by the definition of #Ur. Since (u#h)h!H ! Ur, there







r and uh(x#h) = u
#
h, % h ! H.
Denote K1 the constraints set associated with problem (42). K1 is non-empty
since (u#h)h!H ! Ur. We first claim that K1 is a compact set included in
RCH++ # RCJ . We notice that K1 = N ) Āt,r where
N := {(x, y) ! RCH++ # RCJ : uh(xh) $ u#h % h ! H}
and Āt,r is defined by (29). So, from Lemma 16 we have that K1 is bounded.
Furthermore,K1 is closed. Indeed, take a sequence (x! , y!)!!N inK1 converging
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to some (x, y). Since (x! , y!)!!N ! N , (x, y) belongs to the set clRCH"RCJ N
which is included in RCH++ " RCJ by Point 4 of Assumption 3. So, (x, y) #
RCH++ "RCJ . Since the function uh are continuous (see Point 1 of Assumption
3), (x, y) # N . Since the functions tj are continuous (see Point 1 of Assumption
1), (x, y) # Āt,r and so (x, y) # K1 which completes the proof of the claim.
By Weierstrass’ Theorem, there exists a solution (!x, !y) to problem (42). The
solution to problem (42) is unique since the objective function is strictly quasi-
concave (see Point 3 of Assumption 3) and the constraints set is convex (see
Point 4 of Assumption 1 and Point 3 of Assumption 3).
We complete the proof showing that problems (41) and (42) are equivalent.
Denote with K the constraints set associated with problem (41). Let (!x, !y)
be a solution to problem (41), one gets u1(!x1) $ u1(x#1) = u#1 since (x#, y#) #
K. Thus, (!x, !y) # K1 and (!x, !y) solves problem (42) since since K1 ! K.
Viceversa, suppose that (!x, !y) is a solution to problem (42), obviously (!x, !y) #
K. Let (x, y) # K. If u1(x1) $ u#1, then (x, y) # K1 and so u1(!x1) $ u1(x1).
If u1(x1) < u#1, then u1(!x1) $ u#1 > u1(x1). Thus, (!x, !y) solves problem (41),
which complete the proof of the lemma.
Proposition 19 Let (!x, !y) be the allocation given by Lemma 18. There exists
(!!, !", !#) := ((!!h)h $=1, !", ( !#j)j!J ) # RH%1++ " RC++ " RJ++ such that (!x, !y, !!, !", !#)




Dx1u1(x1)% " = 0
!hDxhuh(xh)% " = 0, & h '= 1
uh(xh)% uh(!xh) = 0, & h '= 1
" + #jDyj tj(yj) = 0, & j # J









Proof. The result follows showing that Karush-Kuhn-Tuker’ conditions are
necessary conditions to solve problem (41). The Lagrangean function associa-
ted with problem (41) is given by













where (!, ", #) := ((!h)h $=1, ", (#j)j!J ) # RH%1+ "RC+ "RJ+ is the vector of the
Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints set of problem (41). So,
30




(1) Dx1u1(x1)! ! = 0
(2) "hDxhuh(xh)! ! = 0, " h #= 1
(3) ! + #jDyj tj(yj) = 0, " j $ J
(4) min{"h, uh(xh)! u!h} = 0, " h #= 1
(5) min{#j, tj(yj)} = 0, " j $ J








It is enough to show that the Jacobian matrix associated with the constraints
functions of problem (41) has full row rank. The Jacobian matrix is described
below.
























0 . . . DxHuH(xH) 0 0 . . . 0
!IC . . . !IC !IC IC . . . IC








0 . . . 0 0 0 . . . DyJ tJ(yJ)
)
*******************+
The matrix above has full row rank since Dxhuh(xh) % 0 and Dyj tj(yj) & 0
(see Point 3 of Assumption 1 and Point 2 of Assumption 3) imply that the
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determinant of the square sub-matrix D defined below is di!erent from zero.






































0 . . . 0 0 0 . . . Dy1J tJ(yJ)
$
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%&
Therefore, the conditions given by (44) are necessary to solve problem (41).
By Lemma 18 and equations (1), (2) and (3) in system (44), the Lagrange
multipliers are unique. Furthermore, Point 3 of Assumption 1 and Point 2
of Assumption 3 imply that the Lagrange multipliers satisfying system (44)
are strictly positive, and consequently, all the constraints in problem (41) are
binding. So, in particular one gets
uh('xh) = u"h ! h "= 1
Therefore from system (44) one deduces system (43) and the lemma is com-
pletely proved. Using Proposition 19, one easily proves the following propo-
sition.





subject to tj(yj) # 0 for each j $ J







Proof. It follows from system (43) in Lemma 19 and the fact that Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker conditions are su"cient to solve problem (45). Indeed, by Points
2 and 3 of Assumption 3 the function u1 is quasi-concave with gradient di!er-
ent from zero, and by Point 4 of Assumption 1 and Point 3 of Assumption 3,
the constraint functions associated with problem (45) are quasi-concave.
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We remind that (!x, !y) ! RCH++ " RCJ is Pareto optimal allocation of the pro-
duction economy E if there is no other allocation ("x, "y) ! RCH++ " RCJ such
that
(1) tj("yj) # 0 for all j ! J and
#
h!H




(2) uh("xh) # uh(!xh) for all h ! H and uk("xk) > uk(!xk) for some k ! H.
Proposition 21 (!x, !y) solves problem (45) if and only if it is a Pareto optimal
allocation of E .
Proof. By definition of Pareto optimal allocation, if (!x, !y) is a Pareto opti-
mal allocation then (!x, !y) solves problem (45). Suppose now that (!x, !y) solves
problem (45), we prove that (!x, !y) is a Pareto optimal allocation. By contra-
diction, suppose that there is an allocation ("x, "y) ! RCH++ " RCJ such that
tj("yj) # 0 for all j ! J ,
#
h!H
"xh $ r +
#
j!J
"yj, uh("xh) # uh(!xh) for all h ! H
and uk("xk) > uk(!xk) for some k ! H. If k = 1, then we get a contradiction
since (!x, !y) solves problem (45). If k %= 1, by the continuity of uk (see Point 1
of Assumption 3), there exists ! > 0 such that uk("xk & !1c) > uk(!xk) where
1c ! RC+ has all the components equal to 0 except the component c which is
equal to 1. Thus, the allocation (x, y) ! RCH++ " RCJ defined below
x1 := "x1 + !1c
xk := "xk & !1c
xh := "xh ' h ! H \ {1, k}
yj := "yj ' j ! J
(46)
satisfies the constraints of problem (45) and u1(x1) > u1(!x1) since u1 is strictly
increasing (see Point 2 of Assumption 3). So, once again we get a contradiction
since (!x, !y) solves problem (45).
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DISES, Universitá degli Studi di Salerno, Italy
Key words: externalities, production economies, competitive equilibrium, regular
economies.
1 Long abstract
We consider a general model of a private ownership economy with consumption
and production externalities. Each firm is characterized by a technology de-
scribed by an inequality on a di!erentiable function called the transformation
function. Each household is characterized by a consumption set, preferences
and an initial endowment of commodities. In this chapter, we assume that
all the consumption sets coincide with the positive orthant of the commod-
ity space. Individual preferences are represented by a utility function. Firms
are owned by households. Utility and transformation functions depend on the
consumption of all households and on the production activities of all firms.
As in Chapter 1, we follow Smale’s extended approach. Our purpose is to
provide su"cient conditions for the regularity of such economies. Showing by
an example that basic assumptions are not enough to guarantee a regularity
result in the space of initial endowments, we provide su"cient conditions for
the regularity in the space of endowments and transformation functions.
Chapter 2 is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the model and basic
assumptions. In Section 3, we briefly resume the definitions of competitive
1 This chapter is based on del Mercato and Platino (2011).
2 Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Statistiche (DISES), Universitá degli
Studi di Salerno, Via Ponte don Melillo, 84084 Fisciano (SA), Italy. E-mail: vin-
cenzo.platino@gmail.com.
Preprint submitted to Elsevier 14 April 2011
equilibria and of the equilibrium function. In Section 4, we state the definition
of a regular economy and we recall its properties. In Section 5, we provide our
example and the notion of a perturbed economy. In Section 6, we introduce
two additional assumptions. In Section 7, we present our main results, namely
Theorem 14 which states the regularity result for for almost all perturbed
economies. In Section 8, we provide an important consequence of Theorem
14, namely Corollary 19 which states the regularity result in the space of
endowments and transformation functions.
In Appendix A, one finds classical results from di!erential topology used in
our analysis. In Appendix B, the reader can find a comparison of our results
with those of Mandel (2008).
2 The model and the assumptions
There is a finite number C of physical commodities or goods labeled by the
superscript c ! C := {1, . . . , C}. The commodity space is RC . There are
a finite number J of firms labeled by the subscript j ! J := {1, . . . , J}
and a finite number H of households or consumers labeled by the subscript
h ! H := {1, . . . , H}. Each firm j is owned by the households and it is
characterized by a technology described by a transformation function. Each
household h is characterized by preferences described by a utility function,
shares on the firms profits and an endowment of commodities. In Chapter
2, we assume that all consumption sets coincide with the positive orthant of
the commodity space. Utility and transformation functions are a!ected by the
consumption choices of all households and by the production activities of all
firms. The notations are summarized below.
• yj := (y1j , .., ycj , .., yCj ) is the production plan of firm j. As usual, the output
components are positive and the input components are negative, y!j :=
(yz)z "=j denotes the production plan of firms other than j and y := (yj)j#J
denotes the production of all the firms.
• xch is the consumption of commodity c by household h,




h ) denotes household h’s consumption, x!h := (xk)k "=h
denotes the consumption of households other than h and x := (xh)h#H
denotes the consumption of all the households.
• For each j ! J , the technology of firm j is described by an inequality
on a function tj called the transformation function. An innovation of this
chapter comes from the dependency of the production set with respect to
the production activities of other firms and the consumption of households.





yj ! RC : tj(yj, y!j, x) " 0
"
where the transformation function tj is a function from RC#RC(J!1)#RCH++
to R, t := (tj)j"J . So, tj describes the way firm j’s technology is a!ected
by the actions of the other agents.
• Each household h ! H has preferences described by a utility function,
uh : (xh, x!h, y) ! RC++ # R
C(H!1)
+ # RCJ $% uh(xh, x!h, y) ! R
uh(xh, x!h, y) is the utility level of household h associated with (xh, x!h, y),
u := (uh)h"H. So, uh describes the way household h’s preferences are a!ected
by the actions of the other agents.
• sjh ! [0, 1] is the share of firm j owned by household h; sh := (sjh)j"J !
[0, 1]J denotes the vector of the shares of all firms owed by household h;
s := (sh)h"H ! [0, 1]JH . The set of all shares is given by




• ech is the endowment of commodity c owned by household h;




h ) denotes household h’s endowment; e := (eh)h"H.
• E := ((uh, eh, sh)h"H, (tj)j"J ) is an economy.
• pc is the price of one unit of commodity c, prices are expressed in units of
account, p := (p1, .., pc, .., pC) ! RC++.
• Given w = (w1, .., wc, .., wC) ! RC , we denote
w\ := (w1, .., wc, .., wC!1) ! RC!1
We make the following assumptions on the transformation functions t =
(tj)j"J .
Assumption 1 For all j ! J ,
(1) The function tj is a C2 function.
(2) For each (y!j, x) ! RC(J!1) # RCH++ , tj(0, y!j, x) " 0.
(3) For each (y!j, x) ! RC(J!1) # RCH++ , the function tj(·, y!j, x) is di!eren-
tiably strictly decreasing, i.e.
& (y!j, x) ! RC(J!1) # RCH++ and & y#j ! RC , Dyj tj(y#j, y!j, x) ' 0
(4) For each (y!j, x) ! RC(J!1)#RCH++ , the function tj(·, y!j, x) is C2 and it is
di!erentiably strictly quasi-concave, i.e. for every yj ! RC, D2yj tj(yj, y!j, x)
3
is negative definite on kerDyj tj(yj, y!j, x).
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We remark that, given the externalities, the assumptions on tj are standard
in “smooth” general equilibrium models. Indeed, from Point 1 of Assumption
1 the production set is closed and smooth, from Point 4 of Assumption 1 it is
convex. Point 2 of Assumption 1 states that inactivity is possible. Point 3 of
Assumption 1 represents the “free disposal” property.
Define the set Yt of all production plans which are on the production sets
whatever are the externalities, that is
Yt :=
!
y" ! RCJ | " (y, x) ! RCH++ # RCJ : tj(y"j, y!j, x) $ 0, % j ! J
"
(1)
The following assumption can be interpreted in a similar way as Assumption
2 in Chapter 1, that is the asymptotic irreversibility and “no free lunch” as-
sumptions at the aggregate level for any possible displacement of the boundary
of the production sets.
Assumption 2 Let b := (bj)j#J ! RJ and t+ b := (tj + bj)j#J . For all b $ 0,
if y" ! CYt+b and
#
j#J
y"j $ 0, then y"j = 0 for every j ! J . 4
The assumption above ensures that the for all possible displacements of the
boundary of the production sets, the set of feasible allocation is bounded, see
Lemma 15.
We make the following assumptions on the utilities functions u = (uh)h#H.
Assumption 3 For all h ! H,
(1) The function uh is continuous in its domain and it is C2 in the interior
of its domain.
(2) For each (x!h, y) ! RC(H!1)++ #RCJ , the function uh(·, x!h, y) is di!eren-
tiably strictly increasing, i.e.
% (x!h, y) ! RC(H!1)++ # RCJ and % x"h ! RC++, Dxhuh(x"h, x!h, y) & 0
(3) For each (x!h, y) ! RC(H!1)++ #RCJ , the function uh(·, x!h, y) is C2 and it
is di!erentiably strictly quasi-concave, i.e., for every xh ! RC++, D2xhuh(xh, x!h, y)
3 Let v and v" be two vectors in Rn, v · v" denotes the inner product of v and v".
Let A be a real matrix with m rows and n columns, and B be a real matrix with
n rows and l columns, AB denotes the matrix product of A and B. Without loss of
generality, vectors are treated as row matrices and A denotes both the matrix and
the following linear application A : v ! Rn ' A(v) := AvT ! R[m] where vT denotes
the transpose of v and R[m] := {wT : w ! Rm}. When m = 1, A(v) coincides with
the inner product A · v, treating A and v as vectors in Rn.
4 CYt+b denotes the asymptotic cone of Yt+b.
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is negative definite on kerDxhuh(xh, x!h).
(4) For each (x!h, y) ! RC(H!1)+ " RCJ and for each u ! Im uh(·, x!h, y),
clRC{xh ! RC++ : uh(xh, x!h, y) # u} $ RC++
Fixing the externalities, the assumptions on uh are standard in “smooth”
general equilibrium models.
T denotes the set of t = (tj)j"J satisfying Assumption 1 and Assumption 2,
and U denotes the set of u = (uh)h"H satisfying Assumption 3.
Remark 4 From now on, u ! U and s ! S are kept fixed and an economy is
parameterized by transformation functions and initial endowments (t, e) taken
in the following set T " RCH++ .
3 Competitive equilibrium with externalities
This section summarizes the notions and the main result of Chapter 1.
Without loss of generality, commodity C is the numeraire good. So, given
p\ ! RC!1++ with innocuous abuse of notation, we denote p := (p\, 1) ! RC++.
Definition 5 (x#, y#, p#\) ! RCH++ " RCJ " RC!1++ is a competitive equilibrium
for the economy (t, e) ! T " RCH++ if




subject to tj(yj, y#!j, x
#) # 0
(2)






















In the following propositions, using the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker necessary and
su!cient conditions, we characterize the solutions of firms and households
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maximization problems.
Proposition 6 Given y!"j ! RC(J"1), x! ! RCH++ and p!\ ! RC"1++ ,
(1) if y!j is a solution to problem (5), then it is the unique solution.
(2) y!j ! RC is the solution to problem (5) if and only if there exists !!j ! R++
such that (y!j ,!
!











Proposition 7 Given x!"h ! R
C(H"1)
++ , y
! ! RCJ and p!\ ! RC"1++ ,





j " 0, then there exists a unique solution to problem (5).
(2) x!h ! RC++ is the solution to problem (5) if and only if there exists "!h !







!)# "hp! = 0





j ) = 0
(6)
Let ! := (RC++$R++)H $ (RC $R++)J $RC"1++ be the set of endogenous vari-
ables with generic element # := (x,", y,!, p\) := ((xh,"h)h#H, (yj,!j)j#J , p\).
We can now describe equilibria using the propositions above and the market
clearing conditions (4). One should notice that, due to the Walras law and
the second equation in (6), the market clearing condition for commodity C is
“redundant”.
For a given economy (t, e) ! T $ RCH++ , the equilibrium function Ft,e : ! %
Rdim!,
Ft,e (#) := ((F
h.1




t,e (#) , F
j.2
t,e (#))j#J , F
M
t,e (#)) (7)




t,e (#) := p + !jDyj tj(yj, y"j, x), F
j.2











#! ! ! is an extended equilibrium for the economy (t, e) ! T $ RCH++ if and
only if Ft,e (#!) = 0. We call #! simply an equilibrium.
Theorem 8 (Existence and compactness) For every economy (t, e) ! T $
RCH++ , the equilibrium set F"1t,e (0) is non-empty and compact.
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4 Regular economy and its properties
In this section, first we recall the notion of a regular economy. Second, we
provide the main properties of a regular economy, see Proposition 10 below.
Definition 9 (t, e) ! T "RCH++ is a regular economy if for each !! ! F"1t,e (0),
(1) Ft,e is a C1 function around !!. 5
(2) The di!erential mapping D!Ft,e(!!) is onto.
R denotes the set of regular economies.
Our main result is Theorem 14 in Section 7 which states the regularity result
for almost all perturbed economies.
Now, define B := RCJ " RCH++ , and endow the set C2(B,R) with the C2
Whitney topology (see Definition 21 in Appendix A), the set RCH++ with the
Euclidean topology, and the set T " RCH++ with the topology induced by the
product topology on C2(B,R)J " RCH++ .
As a consequence of Theorem 14, the set R is a non-empty open subset of
T " RCH++ , see Corollary 19 in Section 8. So, one easily deduces the following
proposition from Theorem 8, Corollary 19, Lemma 20 in Section 8, a conse-
quence of the Regular Value Theorem and the Implicit Function Theorem (see
Corollary 23 and Theorem 26 in Appendix A).
Proposition 10 (Properties of regular economies) For each (t, e) ! R,
(1) the equilibrium set associated with the economy (t, e) is a non-empty finite
set, i.e.,
# r ! N \ {0} : F"1t,e (0) = {!1, ..., !r}
(2) there exist an open neighborhood I of (t, e) in T " RCH++ , and for each
i = 1, . . . , r an open neighborhood Ui of !i in ! and a continuous function
gi : I $ Ui such that
(a) Uj % Uk = & if j '= k,
(b) gi(t, e) = !i,
(c) for all (t#, e#) ! I, F"1t!,e!(0) = {gi(t#, e#) : i = 1, . . . , r},
(d) the economies (t#, e#) ! I are regular.
5 Ft,e is a C1 function around !! means that there exists an open neighborhood
I(!!) of !! in ! such that the restriction of Ft,e to I(!!) is a C1 function.
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5 An example and perturbations of production sets
In this section, first we provide an example of a production economy with ex-
ternalities and an infinite set of equilibria for all initial endowments. Second,
in order to avoid situations such as the one shown by the example, we con-
sider displacements of the boundaries of the production sets, that is, simple
perturbations of the transformation functions.
Consider one household, two firms and two commodities. Let x = (x1, x2) be
the consumption of the household and yj = (y1j , y
2
j ) be the production plan of
firm j = 1, 2. We denote with e = (e1, e2) the initial endowment. The utility








In this example, each firm uses commodity 2 to produce commodity 1. More-
over, the production set of firm j is a!ected by the output of the other firm.
The production set of firm j is the following set.
Yj(y
1
!j) = {(y1j , y2j ) ! R2 : y2j " 0 and tj(y1j , y2j , y1!j) := 2
!
#y2j # y1!j # y1j $ 0}
We remark that all the basic assumptions to get the existence of equilibria
are satisfied except Point 2 of Assumption 1. Although Point 2 of Assumption
1 is not satisfied, the existence result holds true since, at equilibrium, the
aggregate profit is non-negative. See the aggregate profit given by condition
(10) below, and related comments at page 7 of Chapter 1.











#y2j # y"1!j # y1j $ 0
For each firm j = 1, 2, the associated Karush-Kuhn-Thucker conditions are
given by






#y2j # y"1!j # y1j = 0
Thus, at equilibrium, one gets
y"11 = 2p
" # y"12 and y"21 = #(p")2 (8)
and
y"12 = 2p
" # y"11 and y"22 = #(p")2 (9)
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j ) = p
!(2p! ! y!12 )! (p!)2 + p!y!12 ! (p!)2 = 0 (10)





1 + 12 ln x
2
subject to p!x1 + x2 " p!e1 + e2






= !, p!x1 + x2 = p!e1 + e2




(p!e1 + e2) and x!2 =
1
2
(p!e1 + e2) (11)






(e1)2 + 16e2 ! e1
$
(12)
Finally, using (8), (9), (11) and (12), any bundle
((p!, 1), x!, y!1, y
!
2) # R2++ $ R2++ $ R2 $ R2 such that y!12 # [0, 2p!]
is a competitive equilibrium. Thus, we have an infinite set of equilibria which
are parametrized by y!12 # [0, 2p!].
One should notice that without externalities at all, if the output price in-
creases then the output supply of both firms increases too. 6 So, equilibria are
completely determined. In our example, we have an infinite set of equilibria
since, for given y!12 , if the output price p
! increases by k units then the output
supply y!11 of firm 1 increases by 2k units, and consequently the output supply
y!12 of firm 2 does not change since the price increase is compensated by firm
1’s output increase. Therefore, the output supply of firm 2 is indeterminate
since the two e!ects o!set each others.
So, in order to overcome the e!ects described above, we consider simple pertur-
bations of the transformation functions. The definition of a perturbed economy
for a given t # T is provided below.





!y2j ! y1j .
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Definition 11 (Perturbed economies) Let t ! T , a perturbed production
economy (t+ b, e) is parametrized by transformation levels b := (bj)j!J ! RJ++
and endowment e ! RCH++ where
t+ b := (tj + bj)j!J
!t := RJ++ " RCH++ denotes the set of perturbed production economies.
It an easy matter to show that for every (b, e) ! !t, the perturbed production
economy (t+ b, e) ! T " RCH++ since t+ b satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2.
6 Two additional assumptions
One should notice that in the previous example,
(1) the perturbations of the production sets are su"cient to control the first-
order external e#ects,
(2) there are no second-order external e#ects since the derivatives of the
marginal productions with respect to the choices of the others are equal
to zero.
But, as shown in Bonnisseau and del Mercato (2010), in the case of only
consumption externalities, regularity may fail when the second-order exter-
nal e#ects are too strong. So, the basic assumptions and the perturbations
introduced in the previous paragraph may be not su"cient to control the
second-order external e#ects thereby preventing the regularity result. Thus,
we introduce the following two additional assumptions.
Assumption 12 Let (x, y, z) ! RCH++"RCJ"RCJ such that z !
!
j!J




zj = 0. Then, zj
"
f!J
D2yfyj tj(yj, y"j, x)(zf ) < 0 whenever zj #= 0.
Assumption 13 Let (x, v, y, z) ! RCH++ " RCH " RCJ " RCJ such that v !!
h!H
kerDxhuh(xh, x"h, y), z !
!
j!J














D2xkyj tj(yj, y"j, x)(vk) $ 0 whenever vk !
#
j!J
kerDyj tj(yj, y"j, x)
for every k ! H.
Assumptions 12 and 13 can be interpreted in a similar way as Assumption 9
in Bonnisseau and del Mercato (2010). More specifically,
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• Assumption 12 means that the e!ect of changes in the production plans
(yf )f !=j of firms other than j on the marginal production Dyj tj(yj, y"j, x)
is “dominated” by the e!ect of changes in the production plan yj of firm
j. Indeed, under Point 4 of Assumption 1, Assumption 12 states that the




D2yfyj tj(yj, y"j, x)(zf ).
• Points 1 of Assumption 13 means that the e!ect of changes in the con-
sumptions (xk)k#h of the households other than h on the marginal utility
Dxhuh(xh, x"h, y) is “dominated” by the e!ect of changes in the consump-
tion xh of household h. Under Point 3 of Assumption 3, Points 1 of Assump-
tion 13 means that the absolute value of vhD2xjuh(xh, x"h, y)(vh) is larger




We provide below an example of transformation functions which satisfy As-
sumption 12. In the example, there are two firms and two commodities. Let
yj = (y1j , y
2
j ) be the production plan of firm j = 1, 2. Each firm uses com-
modity 2 to produce commodity 1, so y1j > 0 and y
2
j < 0 for every j = 1, 2.
Each production technology is a!ected by the output of the other firm in the
following way.
t1(y1, y2) := 2
"
(!y21)!y12 ! y11 and t2(y2, y1) := 2
"
(!y22)"y11 ! y12
with ! > 0 and " > 0. An example of utility function which satisfies Point
1 of Assumption 13 is provided in Section 4 of Bonnisseau and del Mercato
(2010).
7 Regularity for almost all perturbed economies
In this section, we prove the following theorem which is our main result. Let
t " T , consider the set of perturbed economies "t given by Definition 11.
Theorem 14 (Regularity for almost all perturbed economies) The set
"rt of (b, e) " "t such that (t + b, e) is a regular economy is an open and full
measure subset of "t.
In order to prove the theorem above, we introduce the following notations and
we provide three auxiliary lemmas, namely Lemmas 15, 16 and 17.
For given (b, e) " "t, by Point 1 of Assumptions 1 and 3 the equilibrium
function Ft+b,e is C1 everywhere. So, by Definition 9 the economy (t+ b, e) is
regular if
# #$ " F"1t+b,e(0), rankD!Ft+b,e(#$) = dim#
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Define the following set
!C :=
"
(!, b, e) ! !F!1(0) : rankD! !F (!, b, e) < dim!
#
where the function !F : !" "t # Rdim! is defined by
!F (t, b, e) := Ft+b,e(!)
and denote with # the restriction to !F!1(0) of the projection of !" "t onto
"t, that is
# : (!, b, e) ! !F!1(0) # #(!, b, e) := (b, e) ! "t
We can now express the set "rt given in Theorem 14 as
"rt = "t \ #( !C)
So, in order to prove Theorem 14, it is enough to show that #( !C) is a closed
set in "t and #( !C) is of measure zero.
We first claim that #( !C) is a closed set in "t. From Point 1 of Assumptions 1
and 3, !F is a continuous function on !""t andD! !F is a continuous function on
!F!1(0). The set !C is characterized by the fact that the determinant of all the
square submatrices of D! !F (!, b, e) of dimension dim! is equal to zero. Since
the determinant is a continuous function and D! !F is continuous on !F!1(0),
the set !C is closed in !F!1(0). Thus, #( !C) is closed since the projection # is
proper. 7 The properness of the projection # is provided in Lemma 16 given
below.
Furthermore, we also provide Lemma 15 which states that the set of feasible
allocations is bounded and it is used to prove Step 1 in the proof of Lemma
16.
Lemma 15 For every (t, r) ! T " RC++, the following set is bounded.








Proof. The set Ft,r is bounded since it is included in the set At,r defined in
Lemma 16 of Chapter 1 which is bounded by Assumption 2.
Lemma 16 The projection # : !F!1(0) # "t is a proper function.
Proof. We show that any sequence (!" , b" , e")""N ( !F!1(0), up to a sub-
sequence, converges to an element of !F!1(0), knowing that the sequence
#(!" , b" , e")""N = (b" , e")""N ( "t converges to some (b#, e#) ! "t.
7 See Definition 25 in Appendix A.
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We recall that !! = (x! ,"! , y! ,#! , p!\). In order to simplify the notation,
define
t!(yj, y!j, x) := t(yj, y!j, x) + b
!
Step 1. Up to a subsequence, (x! , y!)!"N converges to (x#, y#) ! RCH+ " RCJ .
The idea of the proof is to show that for an appropriate (t, r) ! T "RC++, the
sequence (x! , y!)!"N belongs to the set Ft,r defined by Lemma 15.
Consider the following set {b! : $ ! N} # {b#} which is obviously compact,
and define
b := max {b! : $ ! N} # {b#} and t := t+ b
By definition, we get t(yj, y!j, x) $ t!(yj, y!j, x) for every (yj, y!j, x) ! RC "








Now, for every commodity c consider the following compact set {e!c : $ !





ech and r := (r
c)c"C















Thus, (x! , y!)!"N ' Ft,r. Consequently, the sequence (x! , y!)!"N belongs to
clFt,r which is compact since it is bounded by Lemma 15. So, up to a sub-
sequence, (x! , y!)!"N converges to some (x#, y#) ! clFt,r ' RCH+ " RCJ , and
thus (x#, y#) ! RCH+ " RCJ .
Step 2. The consumption allocation x# is strictly positive, i.e. x# ( 0.
The proof is based on Point 4 of Assumption 3. By !F h.1(!! , b! , e!) = !F h.2(!! , b! , e!) =
0 and Karush–Kuhn–Tucker su!cient conditions, x!h solves the following prob-














We first claim that for every ! ! N, the point e!h belongs to the budget
constraint of the problem above. By !F j.1("! , b! , e!) = !F j.2("! , b! , e!) = 0 and
Karush–Kuhn–Tucker su!cient conditions, y!j solves the following problem for









Since inactivity is possible, t!j (0, y
!
"j, x
!) " 0 by Point 2 of Assumption 1. So,







which completes the proof of the claim.
We claim now that x#h belongs to the closure of some upper contour set. Ob-






!) " uh(e!h, x!"h, y!)







!) where 1 := (1, . . . , 1) ! RC++. So, taking the limit for ! # +$
and using the continuity of uh given by Point 1 of Assumption 3, since (e!h)!!N
converges to e#h ! RC++ we get uh(x#h+#1, x#"h, y#) " uh(e#h, x#"h, y#) := u. That
is, for every # > 0 the point (x#h + #1) belongs to the following set
{xh ! RC++ : uh(xh, x#"h, y#) " u}
So, the point x#h belongs to the closure of set above which is included in RC++
by Point 4 of Assumption 3. Therefore, x#h ! RCH++ .
Step 3. Up to a subsequence, ($! , p! \)!!N converges to some ($#, p# \) !
RJ++ % RC"1++ .










, ' ! ! N
Define t# := t + b#, where b# is the limit of the sequence (b!)!!N. Taking the












By !F j.1 ("! , b! , e!) = 0, for every commodity c (= C and for all ! ! N we have









Taking the limit, by Points 1 and 3 of Assumption 1, for all c != C we get








Therefore, p! \ # RC"1++ .
Step 4. Up to a subsequence, ("!)!#N converges to some "! # RH++.
By !F h.1 (#! , b! , e!) = 0, considering commodity C for every $ # N we get






Taking the limit and using the continuity of Duh (see Point 1 of Assumption
3) we have






which is strictly positive since fixing the externalities the function uh is di!er-
entiably strictly increasing (see Point 2 of Assumption 3).
To complete the proof of Theorem 14, we claim now that "( !C) is of measure
zero in #t. The result follows by Lemma 17 given below and a consequence
of Sard’s Theorem (see Theorem 24 in Appendix A). Indeed, Lemma 17 and
Theorem 24 imply that there exists a full measure subset $ of #t such that for
each (b, e) # $ and for each #! such that !F (#!, b, e) = 0, rankD" !F (#!, b, e) =
dim%. Now, let (b, e) # "( !C), then there exists # # % such that !F (#, b, e) =
0 and rank D" !F (#, b, e) < dim %. So, (b, e) /# $. This prove that "( !C) is
included in the complementary of $, that is in $C := #t \ $. Since $C has
zero measure, so too does "( !C). Thus, the set of regular perturbed economies
#rt is of full measure since $ $ #rt which completes the proof of Theorem 14.
Lemma 17 0 is a regular value for !F .
Proof. It is enough to prove that for each (#!, b!, e!) # !F"1(0), the Jacobian
matrix D",b,e !F (#!, b!, e!) has full row rank.
Let & := ((&xh,&"h)h#H, (&yj,&!j)j#J ,&p\) # RH(C+1) % RJ(C+1) % RC"1.
We need to show that &D",b,e !F (#!, b!, e!) = 0 implies & = 0. Consider the
computation of the partial Jacobian matrix with respect to the following vari-
ables. 8
((xh,"h, eh)h#H, (yj,!j, bj)j#J , p
\)
8 The computation of D",b,e !F (!!, b!, e!) is described in Appendix B.
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!) +!p\ [IC#1|0] = 0, " k # H































!) +!p\ [IC#1|0] = 0, " f # J
!yj ·Dyj tj(y!j , y!#j, x!) = 0, " j # J






















!#j = 0, " j # J
Since p!C = 1, we get
!"h = 0 for each h # H and !p\ = 0





















!) = 0, " k # H























!) = 0, " f # J











Multiplying both sides of equation !F j.1(!!, b!, e!) = 0 by !yj and using equa-
tion (4) in system (15), we get !yj · p! = !#!j!yj · Dyj tj(y!j , y!#j, x!)=0.
Summing over j and considering commodity C, we obtain !
&
j"J
!y\j · p!\ =
&
j"J
!yCj . Multiplying equation (2) in system (15) by "
!
h, summing over h and










h · p!\. Finally







































Multiplying both sides of equation "F j.1("", b", e") = 0 by !xk and using equa-









"), " k ! H
Now, for every h ! H and for every j ! J define
vh := !
"
h!xh and zj := !yj (16)
From the previous arguments it follows that the vector ((x"h, vh)h!H, (y
"
j , zj)j!J )

































"), " k ! H (20)






































































From (17), (18) and (19), all the conditions of Assumption 13 are satisfied.
Since !!j > 0 for each j ! J , the equality above, (20) and Point 2 of Assump-














Since "!h > 0 for all h ! H, Point 1 of Assumption 13 implies that vh = 0 for
all h ! H, and by (16) we get
!xh = 0, # h ! H
So, condition (17) becomes !
j"J
zj = 0 (21)











!) = 0, # f ! J











!)(zf ) = 0
By (19) and (21), all the conditions of Assumption 12 are satisfied. Since
!!j > 0 for each j ! J , Assumption 12 implies that zj = 0 for each j ! J ,
and so by (16), we get
!yj = 0, # j ! J
Thus, ! = 0 which completes the proof.
The following remark is an easy consequence of Theorem 14.
Remark 18 Since "rt is a full measure subset of "t = RJ++ $RCH++ , then it is
dense in "t. Thus, one easily deduces that "rt is dense in RJ+ $ RCH++ .
8 Regularity in the space of endowments and transformation func-
tions
In the following corollary, we provide an important consequence of Theorem
14, that is the set of regular economies is a non-empty open subset of the
space of endowments and transformation functions.
As in Section 4, we recall that B = RCJ $RCH++ , C2(B,R) is endowed with the
C2 Whitney topology (see Definition 21 in Appendix A) and the set T $RCH++
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is endowed with the topology induced by the product topology on C2(B,R)J!
RCH++ .
Corollary 19 The set R of regular economies is a open subset of T ! RCH++
and it contains the following set
!
t!T
{(t+ b, e) : (b, e) " !rt}. 9
In order to prove the corollary above, we introduce the following notation and
we provide an auxiliary lemma, namely Lemma 20. Describe the set of regular
economies as
R = {(t, e) " T ! RCH++ : # ! " F (·, t, e)"1(0), rankD!F (!, t, e) = dim"}
where the global equilibrium function F : " ! T ! RCH++ $ Rdim! given by
F (!, t, e) := Ft,e(!). Using the definition of open set and the following lemma,
one easily checks that the set R is a open subset of T ! RCH++ .
Lemma 20 The functions F and D!F defined on "! C2(B,R)J ! RCH++ are
continuous.
Proof. We prove that F is continuous. In a analogous way one easily shows
that D!F is a continuous function. Since C2(B,R) is a linear space and F is
a linear function with respect to t " C2(B,R)J , it is enough to prove that
F is continuous at any point (!, 0, e) with t = 0 " C2(B,R)J and (!, e) "
"!RCH++ . Since F is continuous at (!, 0, e) if and only if all its components are
continuous, we show that the component F j.1(!, t, e) = p+ "jDyj tj(yj, y"j, x)
is continuous at (!, 0, e). Using the same strategy, one easily proves that all
the other components of F are continuous.
Fix a commodity c " C and # > 0, we claim that there exists an open neigh-
borhood I of (y, x,"j, pc, 0) in B ! R2++ ! C2(B,R) such that
# (y, x,"j, pc, t) " I, |pc + "jDycj tj(yj, y"j, x)% p
c| < #
Fix #2 > 0 and #3 > 0 such that ## :=
#% #3
"j + #2
> 0, and a continuous and
strictly positive function $ defined on B such that
$(y, x) < ##
Since $ is continuous at (y, x), for given % := ## % $(y, x) > 0 there exists an
open neighborhood I(y, x, #1) of (y, x) in B such that
# (y, x) " I(y, x, #1), $(y, x) < % + $(y, x) = ## (22)
9 The set !rt is given by Theorem 14.
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Consider now the open neighborhood N(0, !) of the function 0 determined by
! in the C2 Whitney topology, that is
N(0, !) ={t ! C2(B,R) : |t(y, x)| < !(y, x) and
"Dkt(y, x)" < !(y, x), # (y, x) ! B and # k = 1, 2}
By (22), for every t ! N(0, !) and for every (y, x) ! I(y, x, "1) we get
|Dycj tj(yj, y!j, x)| $" Dyj tj(yj, y!j, x)" < "
"
Define now the following open neighborhood of (y, x,#j, pc, 0) in B % R2++ %
C2(B,R)
I := I(y, x, "1)% I(#j, "2)% I(pc, "3)%N(0, !)
For every (x, y,#j, pc, t) ! I we get
|pc + #jDycj tj(yj, y!j, x)& p
c $ |pc & pc|+ #j|Dycj tj(yj, y!j, x)| <
"3 + (#j + "2)|Dycj tj(yj, y!j, x)| $ "3 + (#j + "2)"Dyj tj(yj, y!j, x)" <
"3 + (#j + "2)"




So, the claim is completely proved.
Appendix A
Whitney topology
Let B := RCJ % RCH++ . We are interested on C2 functions defined on B (see
Point 1 of Assumption 1), C2(B,R) denotes the set of C2 functions from B to
R. We provide below the definition of the C2 Whitney topology on C2(B,R).
Since C2(B,R) is a linear space, in order to define the C2 Whitney topology
on C2(B,R), it is su!cient to define neighborhood basis of the function zero.
For additional details, see for instance Allen (1981, p. 284), Smale (1974, p.
4) and Golubitsky and Guillemin (1973, p. 42).
Definition 21 Let ! : B ' R be a continuous and strictly positive function.
The open neighborhood N(0, !) of the function 0 ! C2(B,R) is defined as
N(0, !) :={g ! C2(B,R) : |g(z)| < !(z) # z ! B and
"Dkg(z)" < !(z) # z ! B and # k = 1, 2}
Neighborhoods of f ! C2(B,R), for f (= 0 can be constructed for translation,
that is the neighborhood of f determined by ! is given by N(f, !) = f +
N(0, !). For every f ! C2(B,R), the collection of {N(f, !)}!#C0(B,R++) forms
20
a neighborhood basis of the function f in the C2 Whitney topology, where !
varies in the space of all continuous and strictly positive functions.
The C2 Whitney topology on C2(B,R) is not necessarily metrizable. However,
if the set B is compact, the C2 Whitney topology coincides with the topology
of the C2 uniform convergence on compacta. 10
Regular values and transversality
The theory of general economic equilibrium from a di!erentiable prospective
is based on results from di!erential topology. Following are the ones used in
our analysis. These results, as well as generalizations on these issues, can be
found for instance in Guillemin and Pollack (1974), Hirsch (1976), Mas-Colell
(1985) and Villanacci et al. (2002).
Theorem 22 (Regular Value Theorem) Let M , N be Cr manifolds of di-
mensions m and n, respectively. Let f : M ! N be a Cr function. Assume
r > max{m" n, 0}. If y # N is a regular value for f , then
(1) if m < n, f!1(y) = $,
(2) if m % n, either f!1(y) = $, or f!1(y) is an (m " n)-dimensional sub-
manifold of M .
Corollary 23 Let M , N be Cr manifolds of the same dimension. Let f :
M ! N be a Cr function. Assume r % 1. Let y # N a regular value for f
such that f!1(y) is non-empty and compact. Then, f!1(y) is a finite subset of
M .
The following results is a consequence of Sard’s Theorem for manifolds.
Theorem 24 (Transversality Theorem) Let M , " and N be Cr manifolds of
dimensions m, p and n, respectively. Let f : M & " ! N be a Cr function.
Assume r > max{m"n, 0}. If y # N is a regular value for f , then there exists
a full measure subset "" of " such that for any " # "", y # N is a regular
value for f!, where
f! : # # M ! f!(#) := f(#,") # N
Definition 25 Let (X, d) and (Y, d#) be two metric spaces. A function $ :
X ! Y is proper if it is continuous and one among the following conditions
holds true.
(1) $ is closed and $!1(y) is compact for each y # Y ,
10 We recall that by definition, fn ! f in the topology of C2 uniform convergence
on compacta if and only if (fn)n$N, (Dfn)n$N and (D2fn)n$N converge uniformly
to f , Df and D2f respectively on any compact set included in B.
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(2) if K is a compact subset of Y , then !!1(K) is a compact subset of X,
(3) if (xn)n"N is a sequence in X such that (!(xn))n"N converges in Y , then
(xn)n"N has a converging subsequence in X.
The above conditions are equivalent.
Theorem 26 (Implicit Function Theorem) Let M , N be Cr manifolds of the
same dimension. Assume r ! 1. Let (X, ") be a topological space, and f :
M " X # N be a continuous function such that D!f(#, x) exists and it is
continuous on M " X. If f(#, x) = 0 and D!f(#, x) is onto, then there exist
an open neighborhood I of x in X, an open neighborhood U of # in M and
a continuous function g : I # U such that g(x) = #, f(##, x#) = 0 holds for
(##, x#) $ U " I if and only if ## = g(x#), and D!f(##, x#) is onto for every
(##, x#) $ U " I such that f(##, x#) = 0.
Appendix B
The computation of D!,b,e !F (#$, b$, e$) is described below, where 0C%(C!1) is a
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Comparison with Mandel (2008)
In this section we compare the results obtained in Chapter 2 with the regularity
result in Mandel (2008).
As discussed in Introduction, Mandel (2008) has to enlarge the commodity
space treating externalities as additional variables. Moreover, fixing the pro-
duction technologies, in order to provide a regularity result for almost all initial
endowments, the author assumes that a small change in the externalities cre-
ated by all the agents on an agent does not generate changes in the choices
of the latter agent which would in turn involve the exact same change on
the behavior of the others, see Assumption TR2 at page 1395. As stressed in
Introduction, Assumption TR2 involves endogenous variables, more precisely
the derivatives of consumers’ demands and firms’ supplies.
We now show that Assumption TR2 implicitly involves the Lagrange multipli-
ers, that is the equilibrium prices. Furthermore, we show that this assumption
is equivalent to assume that the partial Jacobian matrix of the following com-
ponents




t,e (!) , F
j.2
t,e (!))j!J )
of the equilibrium function defined in (7), with respect to the variables ((xh,"h)h!H,
(yj,#j)j!J ) has full rank, which implies that the Jacobian matrix D!Ft,e(!")
given in Definition 9 is onto.
For simplicity, we prove this equivalence by considering the simple case of
one household, two firms and production externalities among firms. In order
to state Assumption TR2 of Mandel (2008) in this context, one needs to
enlarge the commodity space introducing the additional variables $j ! R2 for
j = 1, 2 which represent the externalities created by firm j. Furthermore, one
requires that at equilibrium the supply yj(p, $#j) of firm j must be equal to
the externalities $j created by firm j, that is
$j " yj(p, $#j) = 0
A simple case: Assumption TR2, Mandel (2008). The square matrix C








"11 # y11(p, "2)
"21 # y21(p, "2)
"12 # y12(p, "1)






















2(p, "1) 0 1
$
%%%%&
We claim that the assumption above is equivalent to assume that the matrix
A defined below has full rank. The matrix A is nothing else that the partial
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Jacobian matrix of the components (F j.1t,e (!) , F
j.2
t,e (!))j=1,2 of the equilibrium








p1 + "1Dy11 t1(y1, y2)
p2 + "1Dy21 t1(y1, y2)
t1(y1, #2)
p1 + "2Dy12 t2(y2, y1)






















Dy11 t1 Dy21 t1 0 Dy12 t1 Dy22 t1 0
"2D2y12
t2 "2D2y22y12
















Dy11 t2 Dy21 t2 0 Dy12 t2 Dy22 t2 0
$
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%&
In order to prove that matrix A has full rank if and only if matrix C has full
rank, we consider an auxiliary matrix B which is the partial Jacobian matrix




(h.1) Dxhuh(xh)! $hp = 0




(j.1) p+ "jDyj tj(yj, y!j) = 0, j = 1, 2







(E) #j ! yj = 0, j = 1, 2
We recall that equation (E) means that at equilibrium the supply yj of firm
j must be equal to the externalities #j created by firm j. The matrix B given
below is the partial Jacobian matrix of the left side of equations (j.1), (j.2),



























































































































!1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 !1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 !1 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 !1 0 0 0 0 1
$
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%&
It is easy to check that matrix A has full rank if and only if matrix B has full
rank. So, in order to prove our claim it is enough to show that matrix B has
full rank if and only if matrix C has full rank.
First of all, one should notice that D"!jyj(p, !!j) given in matrix C can be
obtained di!erentiating the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker necessary and su"cient con-
ditions associated with the profit maximization problem of firm j and using
the Cramer rule. Now, consider the square submatrix B1 obtained by taking
the first three rows and the first three columns of matrix B. The submatrix
B1 has full rank. 11 So, multiplying the first three rows of matrix B by the
inverse matrix of B1 and summing row 1 to row 7 and row 2 to row 8 one gets
the following matrix. 12
11 We recall that a di!erentiably strictly quasi-concave function with gradient dif-
ferent from zero has a bordered Hessian with determinant di!erent from zero (see
Points 3 and 4 of Assumption 1).
12 One should notice that also D"!j!j(p, "!j) is obtained di!erentiating the Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker necessary and su"cient conditions associated with the profit maxi-





















































































0 0 0 !1 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 !1 0 0 0 0 1
$
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%&
Similarly, consider the square submatrixB2 obtained by taking the 4th, the 5th
and the 6th rows and the 4th, the 5th and the 6th columns. The submatrix
B2 has full rank. So, multiplying the 4th, the 5th and the 6th rows of the
previous matrix by the inverse matrix of B2 and summing row 4 to row 9 and



































2(p, "1) 0 0




2(p, "1) 0 0




!2(p, "1) 0 0














2(p, "1) 1 0




2(p, "1) 0 1
$
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%&
Finally, it is easy to check that the matrix above has full rank if and only if
matrix C has full rank. Consequently, B has full rank if and only if C has full
rank which completes the proof of our claim.
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Testable restrictions in a specific model with
externalities and public goods: The collective
consumption model 1
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1 Long abstract
We consider the collective consumption model with the two intra-household
members. We present the “non-parametric” methodology to test two bench-
mark cases of the collective consumption model, that is
• the case where all goods are publicly consumed within the household and
• the case where all goods are privately consumed within the household and
the individual preferences are egoistic.
Di!erently from the the previous literature, we find that the private and
public nature of consumption does have testable implications, even if one
only observes the aggregate group consumption. We believe that such “non-
parametric” approach is able to obtain stronger testability conclusions since
it focuses on conditions which involves personalized prices à la Lindahl and
personalized consumptions. Importantly, we do not require personalized prices
and personalized consumptions to be observable. Also, we derive the minimum
1 This Chapter is based on Cherchye, De Rock and Platino (2010).
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Studi di Salerno, Via Ponte don Melillo, 84084 Fisciano (SA), Italy. E-mail: vin-
cenzo.platino@gmail.com.
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number of observations that enables us to distinguish between the collective
model and the two benchmark cases.
Chapter 3 is organized as follows. Section2 sets the stage by briefly recap-
turing “non-parametric” tests of the unitary model. Section 3 introduces the
necessary and su!cient conditions for the collective rationalization. Section 4
focuses on the two benchmark cases. In Section 5 we describe our main results
and Section 6 contains some concluding remarks.
In Appendix one finds the proofs of the results.
2 The Unitary Model
The unitary approach consider a household as a single decision maker that
maximizes its utility function subject to the budget constraint. Suppose to
observe T choices of n-valued bundles. For each observation t, qt ! Rn+ denotes
the consumption bundle and pt ! Rn++ the associate price vector. Let S :=
{(pt, qt); t = 1, . . . , T} be the set of observations.
In this Section, we want to investigate if the data set has been generated by a
concave, continuous and monotonically increasing utility function U . We start
defining the concept of unitary rationalization of a data set as follows:
Definition 1 Let S = {(pt, qt); t = 1, . . . , T} be a set of observations. A utility
function U provides a unitary rationalization of S if for each qt
U(qt) " U(q)
for all q ! Rn+ such that pt · q # pt · qt.
A unitary rationalization of the data set S requires that, for each observation
t, quantity qt maximizes the utility function subject to the budget constraint
pt · qt.
Varian (1982) shows that there exists a concave, continuous and monotonically
increasing utility function that rationalizes the data set S if and only if the
the data set S satisfies the Generalize Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP).
Definition 2 (GARP) Let S = {(pt, qt); t = 1, . . . , T} be a set of observa-
tions. The set S satisfies the Generalize Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP)
if there exist relations R0, R such that
(i) if ps · qs " ps · qt then qsR0qt;
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(ii) if qsR0qu, quR0qv, . . . , qzR0qt for some (possibly empty) sequence (u, v, ...,
z) then qsRqt;
(iii) if qsRqt then pt · qt ! pt · qs.
Rule (i) states that the consumption vector qs is ‘direct revealed’ over qt (i.e.
qsR0qt) if qs was chosen when the consumption vector qt was available (i.e.
ps · qs " ps · qt). R is the transitive closure of R0 and it is known as the
‘revealed preference’ relation; see rule (ii). Finally rule (iii) states that each
consumption vector qt is expenditure minimizing (i.e. pt · qt ! pt · qs) with
respect to all the revealed preferred vectors qs (i.e. qsRqt).
This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Let S = {(pt, qt); t = 1, . . . , T} be a set of observations. The
following conditions are equivalent:
(i) there exists a concave, continuous and monotonically increasing utility
function U that provide a unitary rationalization of S;
(ii) The data set S satisfies GARP.
Finally, one should observe that unitary rationality can be tested if we have
a data set with at least two observations and two goods.
A data set S with only one observation and/or one good always satisfies
GARP. More precisely, if T = 1 it is not possible to specify the set of the
revealed preferred bundles, that is the ‘better than’ set. Therefore it is not
possible to reject GARP. Moreover, if qt # R+ all the scalar products in
Definition 2 are scalar multiplications. This implies that qsR0qt if and only if
qs " qt and obviously also qsRqt if and only if qs " qt. Thus, the quantity qt
is always cost minimizing. It follows that it is not possible to reject GARP.
3 General Collective Consumption Model
The collective approach assumes that members within a household are het-
erogeneous and have own preferences. Browing and Chiappori (1998) consider
a non-unitary household model in which the decisions taken by the two intra-
household members are Pareto e!cient, without specifying a particular point
on the Pareto frontier. The authors assume that all the goods can be con-
sumed privately, publicly or both, yet only prices and aggregate demand with
respect to some power distribution between the two intra-household members
are observed. Using a parametric approach, Browning and Chiappori (1998)
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prove that the aggregate demand is compatible with the Pareto optimal deci-
sion behavior if it satisfies some restrictions on a Pseudo-Slutsky matrix. The
Pseudo-Slutsky matrix is the sum of the classical Slutsky matrix which mea-
sures the change in demand induced by the variation of prices and income,
and another matrix which measures the change in demand induced by the
variation of power distribution. In addition, Browning and Chiappori (1998)
show that a collective model with two intra-household members can be tested
if we have a data set with at least five goods.
This section recaptures the principal results of Cherchye, De Rock, Vermeulen
(2007) . More precisely, the authors, using a nonparametric approach, provide
testable conditions involving personalized prices à la Lindahl and personalized
consumptions. However, the authors do not require that personalized prices
and personalized consumptions are observable data.
3.1 General Collective Rationality
We consider one household with two members (A and B) that purchases a
vector of goods q ! Rn+ with corresponding prices p ! Rn++. All goods can be
consumed privately, publicly or both.
We assume that the empirical analyst has no information on the decomposi-
tion of the observed quantities q into the bundles of private and public con-
sumptions. Therefore, we need to introduce (unobserved) feasible personalized
quantities x that comply with the (observed) aggregate quantities q. More
formally, we define:
x = (xA, xB, xG) with xA, xB, xG ! Rn+, and xA + xB + xG = q (1)
The feasible personalized quantities x capture a possible feasible decomposi-
tion of the (observed) aggregate consumption q in the (unobserved) private
quantities xA and xB and in the public consumption xG.
Suppose to observe T choices of n-valued bundles. For each observation t the
vector qt ! Rn+ records the quantities chosen by the group under the prices
pt ! Rn++. We denote with S = {(pt, qt); t = 1, . . . , T} the corresponding set of
T observations (i.e. the data set). Collective rationality in terms of the general
collective model (general-CR) of a set of observations S requires the existence
of utility functions UA and UB such that each observed quantity bundle can
be characterized as Pareto e!cient. Thus, we get the following definition:
Definition 4 (general-CR) Let S = {(pt, qt); t = 1, . . . , T} be a set of ob-
servations. A pair of utility functions UA and UB provides a general-CR (i.e.
a collective rationalization in terms of the general collective model) of S if for






and µt ! R++ such that:
UA(xt) + µtU
B(xt) " UA(x) + µtUB(x)
for all x = (xA, xB, xG) with xc ! Rn+, c = A,B,G and pt · (xA + xB + xG) #
pt · qt.
The weight µt represents the relative bargaining power of member B with
respect to member A. It reflects the Pareto e!cient characterization of the
optimal intra-household allocation. A general-CR of the data set S requires
the existence, for each observation t, of feasible personalized quantities xt that
maximize a weighted sum of the intra-household member utilities subject to
the household budget constraint pt · qt. 3
3.2 Revealed preference characterization
Following Cherchye, De Rock, Vermeulen (2007), we define feasible personal-
ized prices (pAt , p
B







t ) and p
B
t = (pt $ pAAt , pt $ pABt , pt $ pAGt )




t ! Rn+ and pct # pt, c = A,B,G
(2)
where pAt and p
B
t captures the fractions of the price for the feasible person-
alized quantities xt paid respectively by members A and B. More precisely,
pAAt and p
AB
t are respectively the price paid by member A for the own private
consumption and for the private consumption of member B, and pAGt is the
price paid by member A for the public consumption. The interpretation of pBt
is similar. One should notice that pAt and p
B
t can be interpreted as the Lindahl
prices of member A and B respectively.
Proposition 6 states that collective rationality requires GARP consistency for
each individual member:
Definition 5 Consider feasible personalized prices and quantities for a set of
observations S = {(pt, qt); t = 1, . . . , T}. For m = A,B, the set {(pmt , xt);
t = 1, ..., T} satisfies GARP if there exist relations Rm0 , Rm such that
(i) if pms · xs " pms · xt then xsRm0 xt;
3 It is immediate to note that collective rationalization of a data set S is more
general that unitary rationalization. In fact, if µt = 0 and xAt = qt, for each obser-
vation t, we get back to unitary rationalization. However, following Cherchye, De
Rock, Vermeulen (2007), we did not allow for this possibility. Therefore, we assume
µt ! R++ for each observation t.
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(ii) if xsRm0 xu, xuR
m
0 xv, . . . , xzR
m
0 xt for some (possibly empty) sequence (u,
v, ..., z) then xsRmxt;
(iii) if xsRmxt, then pmt · xt ! pmt · xs.
The following Proposition is due to Cherchye, De Rock, Vermeulen (2007). It
provides the necessary and su!cient conditions for a collective rationalization
of the data set S in terms of feasible personalized prices and quantities.
Proposition 6 Let S = {(pt, qt); t = 1, . . . , T} be a set of observations. The
following conditions are equivalent:
(i) there exists a combination of concave, continuous and monotonically in-
creasing utility functions UA and UB that provide a general-CR of S;
(ii) there exist feasible personalized prices and quantities such that for each
member m = 1, 2, the set {(pmt , xt); t = 1, ..., T} satisfies GARP.
Proof. See Cherchye, De Rock, Vermeulen (2007), Proposition 1, page 557.
Collective rationality (i.e. Proposition 6) di"ers from unitary rationality (i.e.
Proposition 1), since it requires GARP consistency for each intra-household
member m in terms of the (unobserved) feasible personalized prices and quan-
tities (i.e. pmt and xt, m = A,B) and not at the (observed) aggregate level
S.
One should notice that, for each observation t, it is possible to construct
infinite feasible personalized prices and quantities, (pAt , p
B
t , xt). Therefore, col-
lective rationality requires that there exists at least one feasible personalized
data set !S := {(pAt , pBt , xt); t = 1, . . . , T} such that the the necessary and
su!cient conditions given in Proposition 6 are satisfied.
Since the necessary and su!cient conditions given in Proposition 6 are ex-
pressed in terms of the (unobservable) variables, it is however di!cult to use
them in empirical work. Cherchye, De Rock, Vermeulen (2007) construct nec-
essary and su!cient conditions expressed in terms of the (observed) aggregate
prices and quantities S. 4
Finally, one should observe that collective rationality can be tested if we have
a data set with at least three observations and three goods.
A data set S with two observations and/or two goods always fulfils the con-
4 See Cherchye, De Rock, Vermeulen (2007), Proposition 2, page 561 and Proposi-
tion 4, page 564.
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ditions given in Proposition 2. Suppose to have T = 2 and n ! 2. In this
case, one can always assign one observation to each individual, say for exam-
ple xA1 = q1, x
B





t = 0 for each observation t = 1, 2. Using this setting, GARP cannot
be rejected. In fact one always has x1RA0 x2 (or equivalently p
A
1 ·q1 = p1 ·q1 ! 0)
and 0 " pA2 · q1 = p2 · q1. Similar arguments hold for member B. Suppose now
to have T ! 2 and n = 2. In this case, we can always assign one good to each
individual, say for example (xAt )1 = (qt)1, (x
B





t = 0 for each observation t = 1, . . . , T . Since all scalar products
are scalar multiplications, it is easy to show that it is not possible to reject
GARP.
4 Two benchmark models
In the previous Section, we have considered a model that takes into account
intra-household externalities and public consumption. In this section we will
focus on two benchmark cases. Specifically, we will consider a model in which
all the the goods are publicly consumed and another model in which all the
goods are privately consumed and individuals have egoistic preferences (i.e.
egoistic model). Due to complexity of the general model, these two special
cases are mostly used in standard economic theory.
Chiappori and Ekeland (2006), using a parametric approach, show that the
public or private nature of household consumption does not have testable
implications.
4.1 All Goods are Publicly Consumed
In the first benchmark we assume that all the consumption is public. We for-
malize this by assuming individuals preferences that are represented by a con-
cave, continuous and monotonically increasing utility functions Umpub(x
G) :=
Um(0, 0, xG). Clearly, in this case we have xG = q (or xA + xB = 0). So,
the actual personalized quantities are e!ectively observed. Thereby, we de-
fine collective rationality in terms of the collective model with only public
consumption (public-CR) as follows:
Definition 7 (public-CR) Let S = {(pt, qt); t = 1, . . . , T} be a set of ob-
servations. A pair of utility functions UApub and U
B
pub provides a public-CR of
S (i.e. a collective rationalization in terms of the collective model with only
public consumption), if for each observation t there exists µt # R++ such that
UApub(qt) + µtU
B
pub(qt) ! UApub(q) + µtUBpub(q)
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for all q ! Rn+ and pt · q " pt · qt.
A public rationalization of the data set S requires that each consumption
vector qt maximize a weighted sum of the intra-household member utilities
subject to the household budget constraint pt · qt.
As for the collective model, the analyst does not observe the fraction of the
price paid by the two members for the quantities qt. To characterize non-
parametric conditions for public rationalization, we need to define feasible
personalized prices (pAt , p
B
t ). Obviously, the Lindahl prices p
AG
t and pt # pAGt
are the only relevant components to get the desired characterization.
Proposition 8 Let S = {(pt, qt); t = 1, . . . , T} be a set of observations. The
following conditions are equivalent:
(i) there exists a combination of concave, continuous and monotonically in-
creasing utility functions UApub and U
B
pub that provides a public-CR of S;
(ii) there exist feasible personalized prices and quantities, with xAt = x
B
t = 0,
such that for each member m = A,B, the set {(pmt , xt); t = 1, ..., T} satisfies
GARP.
The above proposition follows directly from Proposition 6. A public-CR re-
quires GARP consistency for each intra-household member m in terms of
(unobserved) feasible personalized prices and (observed) quantities (i.e. pmt
and qt, m = A,B).
Proposition 8 is di!erent from Proposition 6. More precisely, the conditions
for general-CR are nonlinear since all scalar multiplications are expressed in
terms of (unobserved) feasible personalized prices (pAt , p
B
t ) and quantities, qt.
Di!erently, the conditions for public-CR are linear since all scalar multipli-
cations are in terms of (unobserved) feasible personalized prices (pAt , p
B
t ) and
(observed) quantities qt. This di!erence suggests that these two models have
di!erent testable implications.
4.2 Egoistic Model
In the second benchmark case, all the goods are privately consumed i.e.
xA + xB = q. In addition, the individuals have egoistic preferences, which
implies that they only care for their own consumption (i.e. no consumption
externalities). We formalize this by assuming that individual preferences are
represented by concave, continuous and monotonically increasing utility func-
tions UAego(x
A) := UA(xA, 0, 0) and UBego(x
B) := UB(0, xB, 0). The correspond-
ing concept of collective rationality in terms of the collective model with all
8
private consumption is the following:
Definition 9 A pair of utility functions UAego and U
B
ego provides an egoistic-CR
of S (i.e. a collective rationalization in terms of the collective model with all
consumption private and egoistic preferences), if for each observation t there
exist feasible personalized quantities xt, with xGt = 0 and µt ! R++ such that
UAego(x
A




t ) " UAego(xA) + µtUBego(xB)
for all x = (xA, xB, 0) with xm ! Rn+, m = A,B and pt · (xA + xB) # pt · qt.
Egoistic-CR of the data set S requires that there exist, for each observation
t, ‘private’ quantities xAt and x
B
t that maximize a weighted sum of the intra-
household member utilities subject to the household budget constraint pt · qt.
The econometrician does not observe the true private quantities (qAt , q
B
t ). Dif-
ferently from the previous case, the (observed) prices pt are exactly the prices
paid for each individual for own consumption. More precisely, for each ob-
servation t, pAAt = pt, and p
AB
t = 0. Proposition 10 gives the necessary and
su!cient conditions for a egoistic-CR of the data set S:
Proposition 10 Let S = {(pt, qt); t = 1, . . . , T} be a set of observations. The
following conditions are equivalent:
(i) there exists a combination of concave, continuous and monotonically in-
creasig utility functions UAego and U
B
ego that provide an egoistic-CR of S;
(ii) there exist feasible personalized prices, with pAAt = pt and p
AB
t = 0, and
feasible personalized quantities, with xGt = 0, such that for each member m =
A,B, the set {(pmt , xt); t = 1, ..., T} satisfies GARP.
Egoistic-CR (Proposition 10) requires GARP consistency at individual level
in terms of the (observed) prices pt and the (unobserved) feasible personalized
quantities xt. The necessary and su!cient conditions are di"erent with respect
to those of general-CR and public-CR. In particular these conditions are linear
in terms of the (unobserved) feasible personalized quantities xt. Therefore, this
di"erence suggests that the three models have di"erent testable implications.
5 Testing the nature of goods
In this section we first provide two examples that show that the nature of goods
is testable even if one observes only aggregate data. Our results thus imply
that consistency with the general model does not necessarily imply consistency
with the two benchmark models. Secondly, our examples also show that the
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two benchmark models are independent from each other. More precisely, if
the aggregate data set is consistent with one of the two benchmark models, it
need not be consistent with the other benchmark model.
5.1 Collective Rationality does not imply public-CR
In this subsection we provide an example that contains a data set that satisfies
general-CR but not public-CR.
Example 1 Suppose that the data set S contains the following 3 observations
of bundles consisting of 3 quantities:
q1 = (5, 2, 2), q2 = (2, 5, 2), q3 = (2, 2, 5)
p1 = (4, 1, 1), p2 = (1, 4, 1), p3 = (1, 1, 4)
This data set S satisfies the conditions in Proposition 6 (i.e. there exists a
general-CR), but it fails to satisy the conditions in Proposition 8 (i.e. there
does not exist a public-CR).
See the Appendix for the explanation of the example.
This example leads to two remarkable results. Firstly, as discussed in the in-
troduction, it contrasts with the results of Chiappori and Ekeland (2006).
These authors, following a parametric approach, show that the general collec-
tive model and the collective model with only public consumption are indistin-
guishable if one only observes aggregate data. More precisely, the authors show
that, when only aggregate data are available, the general collective consump-
tion model has exactly the same testability implications. Example 1 shows
that this is no longer the case if one adopts our revealed preference approach.
Secondly, this example shows that a data set with only three goods and three
observations is enough to distinguish between the general collective model
and the collective model with only public consumption. Moreover, one should
notice that, as the general collective consumption model, it is not possible
to reject public-CR if the number of observations or the number of goods is
smaller than three.
Suppose T = 2 and n ! 2. One can always consider the following personalized
prices: pAG1 = p1 and p
AG
2 = 0. It is easy to verify that, using these feasible
personalized prices, GARP conditions in Proposition 8 cannot be rejected.
Next, if n = 2 and T ! 2, one can always suppose that each individual pay for
one good, say for example (pAGt )1 = (p1)1 and (p
AG
t )2 = 0, for each observation
t = 1, ..., T . Again, it is immediate to verify that it is a solution for the GARP
conditions in Proposition 8.
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Thus, three observations and three goods represent the lower bounds for the
collective models to have testable implications.
Finally, it should be noted that the parametric approach needs a data set with
at least five goods to test the collective consumption model characterized
in Propositions 8; see Browning and Chiappori (1998) and Chiappori and
Ekeland (2006). Thus, our revealed preference approach requires a smaller
number of goods than the parametric approach.
5.2 General-CR does not imply egoistic-CR
In this section, we provide an example with contains a data set that satisfies
general-CR but not an egoistic-CR.
Example 2 Suppose that the data set S contains the following 4 observations
of bundles consisting of 4 quantities:
q1 = (1, 0, 0, 0), q2 = (0, 1, 0, 0), q3 = (0, 0, 1, 0), q4 = (0, 0, 0, 1)
p1 = (7, 4, 4, 4), p2 = (4, 7, 4, 4), p3 = (4, 4, 7, 4), p4 = (4, 4, 4, 7)
This data set S satisfies the conditions in Proposition 6 (i.e. there exists a
general-CR), but it rejects the conditions in Proposition 10 (i.e. there does
not exist an egoistic-CR).
See the Appendix for the explanation of the example.
As for the previous examples, we have two remarks. First, in contrast to the
di!erentiable approach, our ‘revealed preference’ methodology makes it possi-
ble to distinguish between the general collective model and the egoistic model.
Thus, we can conclude that the private nature of the goods is testable. Sec-
ondly, in our example we considered a data set with four observations and
four goods. However, we conjecture that it is possible to figure out examples
for data set for with four observations and three goods. For mathematical
elegance we have used many zeros in our data set.
Finally, one should notice that we considered a data set with four observations.
We prove in Proposition 11 that this is the minimum number of observations
that we need to test egoistic-CR.
Proposition 11 Let S = {(pt, qt); t = 1, 2, 3} be a set of three observations.
Suppose that there exists a general-CR of S, then there always exists a com-
bination of concave, continuous and monotonically increasig utility functions
UAego and U
B
ego that provides an egoistic-CR of S.
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5.3 Independence of egoistic-CR and public-CR
In the previous subsection, we have shown that the general collective model is
distinguishable from the two specific benchmark models. In the Appendix we
argue that it is possible to distinguish between the two benchmark models.
More precisely, in the Appendix we show that the data set in Example 1
satisfies the testable conditions for a egoistic-CR, and the data set in Example
2 satisfies the testable conditions for a public-CR. Thus, we can conclude
that if the data set is consistent with one benchmark model, this does not
necessarily imply that it is also consistent with the other benchmark model.
It is enough have a data set with four observations and four goods 5 to be
able to test the nature of the goods. Moreover, this result could directly carry
over to ‘intermediate’ collective models that stand between the two benchmark
cases, i.e models which assume that part of the goods is privately consumed
(without externalities) while all other goods are publicly consumed. See Cher-
chye, De Rock, Vermeulen (2010) for a detailed discussion.
6 Conclusion
Chapter 3 has adopted the nonparametric ‘revealed preference’ methodology
due to Cherchye, De Rock, Vermeulen (2007) for analyzing the testable restric-
tions for the two benchmark cases of the collective consumption model. That
is, the case in which all the goods are publicly consumed and the case in which
all the goods are privately and individuals have egoistic preferences. These two
polar cases were analyzed previously by Chiappori and Ekeland (2006). Using
a parametric approach, the authors showed that these two benchmark cases
have the same testable restrictions than the general model (i.e. all goods can
be consumed privately, publicly or both). So, their main result is that it is
not possible to test the nature of the goods from aggregate data on group
behavior.
Di!erently from Chiappori and Ekeland (2006), using a nonparametric char-
acterization which involve personalized prices à la Lindahl and feasible per-
sonalized consumptions, we show that the nature of goods is testable. More
precisely, we obtain di!erent testable restrictions as soon as we have a data
set with four observations and four goods. Importantly, in our approach, we
do not require that Lindahl prices and personalized quantities are observable.
Therefore, this approach could be useful for empirical applications.
5 We think that it should be enough a data set with four observations and three
goods.
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We want to conclude this chapter considering a possible extension. This basic
framework could be extended considering many group members. Of course,
this generalization will not a!ect the core of our results.
Appendix
Example 1
There exists a general-CR of S. Consider the following personalized quantities
and prices:
x1 = (q1, 0, 0), p
A
1 = (p1, 0, p1), p
B









2 = (p2, 0, p2), p
B
2 = (0, p2, 0)
x3 = (0, q3, 0), p
A
3 = (p3, 0, p3), p
B
3 = (0, p3, 0)
It is easy to show that the GARP conditions in Proposition 6 are satisfied
for both members. So, one can conclude that the data set at hand satisfies
general-CR.
There exists an egoistic-CR of S. It is immediate to see that these personalized
feasible prices and quantities satisfy the conditions in Proposition 10. So, we
can conclude that the data set in this example is consistent with an egoistic-
CR.
There does not exist a public-CR of S. Let us prove this ad absurdum and
assume that we have a construction of feasible prices that satisfies condition
(ii) in Proposition 8.
One should notice that for any t, s = 1, 2, 3, with t != s, the structure of the
data set in this example implies that pt · qt > pt · qs. Therefore we must have
feasible prices such that either pAGt ·qt > pAGt ·qs or (pt"pAGt )·qt > (pt"pAGt )·qs.
GARP conditions in Proposition 8 require that if pAGt · qt # pAGt · qs, then
pAGs · qs $ pAGs · qt. So, since for any t, s = 1, 2, 3 with t != s, ps · qs > ps · qt
and pAGs · qs $ pAGs · qt one gets (ps " pAGs ) · qs > (ps " pAGs ) · qt. Therefore,
if xtRA0 xs, we must have xsR
B
0 xt. Given that this holds for any t, s = 1, 2, 3,
with t != s, we conclude that (i) x1RA0 x2 and x2RA0 x3 for member A, and (ii)
x3RB0 x2 and x2R
B
0 x1 for member B is a possible solution of public-CR.
Assume that pAG2 = (!1, !2, !3). The GARP condition for member A in Propo-
sition 8 requires that
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pAG2 · q2 ! pAG2 · q1 " 2!1 + 5!2 + 2!3 ! 5!1 + 2!2 + 2!3
" 0 ! !1 # !2.
The GARP condition for member B in Proposition 8 requires that
(p2 # pAG2 ) · q2 ! (p2 # pAG2 ) · q3 " 2(1# !1) + 5(4# !2) + 2(1# !3)
! 2(1# !1) + 2(4# !2) + 5(1# !3)
" 3 ! !2 # !3.
Overall, this implies that 3 ! !2 ! !1, which gives us the desired contradiction
since by construction !1 ! 1. Of course, all the other possible solutions of
public-CR lead to the same contradictions. Therefore, we conclude that there
cannot exist a public-CR of the data set in Example 1.
Example 2
There exists a general-CR of S. Consider the following personalized quantities
and prices with pAG2 = (4, 3.5, 0, 0) and p
AG
3 = (4, 4, 3.5, 0).
x1 = (0, 0, q1), p
A
1 = (p1, p1, p1), p
B
1 = (0, 0, 0);
x2 = (0, 0, q2), p
A




2 = (0, 0, p2 # pAG2 );
x3 = (0, 0, q3), p
A




3 = (0, 0, p3 # pAG3 );
x4 = (0, 0, q4), p
A
4 = (0, 0, 0), p
B
4 = (0, 0, p4).
It is easy to show that the GARP conditions in Proposition 6 are satisfied
for both members. So, one can conclude that the data set at hand satisfies
general-CR.
There exists a public-CR of S. It is immediate to see that these personalized
feasible prices and quantities satisfy the conditions in Proposition 8. So, we
can conclude that the data set in this example is consistent with a public-CR.
There does not exist an egoistic-CR of S. Let us prove this ad absurdum and
assume that we have a construction of feasible prices that satisfies condition
(ii) in Proposition 10.
Again, one should notice that for any t, s = 1, 2, 3, with t $= s, the structure
of the data set in this example implies that pt · qt > pt · qs. Therefore, with no
loss of generality, we can assume that the solution of feasible prices leads to
(i) x1RA0 x2, x2R
A
0 x3 and x3R
A





x2RB0 x1 for member B.
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Assume that xA2 = (0,!, 0, 0) and x
A
3 = (0, 0, ", 0). The GARP conditions for
the two members in Proposition 10 require that the following holds:
pA2 · x2 ! pA2 · x1 " 7! ! 4;
pA3 · x3 ! pA3 · x2 " 7" ! 4! ! 4;
pB2 · x2 ! pB2 · x" 7(1# !) ! 4(1# ") ! 4;
pB3 · x3 ! pB3 · x4 " 7(1# ") ! 4.








4 ! ! and thus also that
! $ 34 . Thereby we obtain the desired contradiction and we conclude that
there cannot exist an egoistic-CR of the data set in Example 2.
Proof of Proposition 4. Example 1 of Cherchye, De Rock, Vermeulen
(2007) shows that we cannot have a general-CR if we have a data set with
the following structure: p1 · q1 $ p1 · (q2 + q3), p2 · q2 $ p2 · (q1 + q3) and
p3 · q3 $ p3 · (q1 + q2) hold simultaneously. With no loss of generality, we
assume that p2 · q2 < p2 · (q1 + q3).
Consider the following personalized quantities and prices for an ! % [0, 1]:
x1 = (q1, 0, 0), p
A
1 = (p1, 0, p1), p
B
1 = (0, p1, 0)
x2 = (!q2, (1# !)q2, 0), pA2 = (p2, 0, p2), pB2 = (0, p2, 0)
x3 = (0, q3, 0), p
A
3 = (p3, 0, p3), p
B
3 = (0, p3, 0)
These feasible prices and quantities are consistent with the collective model
with only private goods (i.e. xGt = 0) and egoistic preferences (i.e. p
AA
t = pt
and pABt = 0).
In order to prove that this is a solution for egoistic-CR, we need to check
GARP for the sets {(pAt , xt); t = 1, 2, 3} and {(pBt , xt); t = 1, 2, 3}.
We start considering member A. We need to verify that condition (iii) in
Definition 5 is satisfied. First, for each observation t, we construct the set of
the revealed preferred bundles (i.e. Opening Conditions) and after we check if
every observation t is cost minimizing over the revealed preferred set (Closing
Conditions).
Opening Conditions:
(i.1) pAA1 · xA1 $ pAA1 · xA2 & p1 · q1 $ !p1 · q2;
(ii.1) pAA1 · xA1 $ pAA1 · xA3 & p1 · q1 $ 0;
(iii.1) pAA2 · xA2 $ pAA2 · xA3 & !p2 · q2 $ 0.
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Closing Conditions:
(iv.1) pAA2 · xA2 ! pAA2 · xA1 " !p2 · q2 ! p2 · q1;
(v.1) pAA3 · xA3 ! pAA3 · xA1 " 0 ! p3 · q1;
(vi.1) pAA3 · xA3 ! pAA3 · xA2 " 0 ! !p3 · q2.
We consider now member B. The conditions to satisfy the GARP are given
by:
Opening Conditions:
(i.2) (p3 # pAB3 ) · xB3 $ (p3 # pAB3 ) · xB2 " p3 · q3 $ (1# !)p3 · q2;
(ii.2) (p3 # pAB3 ) · xB3 $ (p3 # pAB3 ) · xB1 " p3 · q3 $ 0;
(iii.1) (p2 # pAB2 ) · xB2 $ (p2 # pAB2 ) · xB1 " (1# !)p2 · q2 $ 0.
Closing Conditions:
(iv.2) (p2 # pAB2 ) · xB2 ! (p2 # pAB2 ) · x3 " (1# !)p2 · q2 ! p2 · q3;
(v.2) (p1 # pAB1 ) · xB1 ! (p1 # pAB1 ) · xB3 " 0 ! p1 · q3;
(vi.2) (p1 # pAB1 ) · xB1 ! (p1 # pAB1 ) · xB2 " 0 ! (1# !)p1 · q2.
Conditions (ii.m), (iii.m),m = A,B are trivially satisfied. So, x1RA0 x3, x2R
A
0 x3,
and x3RB0 x1, x2R
B
0 x1. One should notice that also the corresponding closing
conditions, i.e. (v.m), (vi.m), m = A,B are trivially satisfied.
We do not know if x1 belongs to the set of the revealed preferred bundles of x2
(i.e. if x1RA0 x2), and if x3 belongs to the set of the revealed preferred bundles
of x2 (i.e. if x3RA0 x2), or equivalently if conditions (i.m), m = A,B hold true.
However, given that p2 · q2 < p2 · (q1 + q3), there must exists an ! % [0, 1] such
that !p2 · q2 ! p2 · q1 and (1# !)p2 · q2 ! p2 · q3. This implies that conditions
(iv.m), m = A,B are satisfied. So, all closing conditions are satisfied.
Therefore GARP is satisfied and we cannot reject egoistic-CR.
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